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ISSUED PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: 
Pursuant to this Court's Order of July 17, 2006, which granted William Beddoes' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the sole issue presented for review is: 
"Whether a motion for an award of costs, filed after the entry of judgment, delays 
the entry of judgment for puiposes of appeal until the motion is resolved." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall 978 P.2d 
460 (Utah 1999); State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The court of 
appeals' legal conclusions are reviewed for coiTectness and are accorded no deference by 
this Court. Reese v. Reese. 1999 UT 75, 10. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT: 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter as follows: 
A. Date of Entry of Decision to Be Reviewed: The Utah Court of Appeals' 
Memorandum Decision was entered on March 30, 2006. (Appendix A.) 
B. Petitioner/Appellant William Beddoes (hereinafter "'Beddoes") filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 28, 2006. 
C. The Utah Supreme Court granted Beddoes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
on July 17, 2006, as to the issue for review presented above. (Appendix B.) 
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D. Statute Conferring Jurisdiction on Supreme Court: Appellate jurisdiction to 
review a judgment of the court of appeals is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS: 
Rule 51(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governs disposition of 
petitions for writ of certiorari, where an order granting a petition has been entered. A 
copy of Rule 51(b) is attached at Appendix F. 
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs disposition of a request 
for court costs. A copy is attached at Appendix Ff 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from the summary judgment dismissal of Beddoes' complaint for 
malicious prosecution. [R. at 196-197 (summary judgment order).] Beddoes filed the 
complaint seeking redress for the damages he incurred in defending himself against 
certain ciiminal accusations made by the respondent/appellee, Gaiy Giffm (hereinafter 
"GiffirT). [R. at 1-9.] Beddoes alleged that Giffin's accusations were entirely false. 
[Id.] The accusations resulted in Beddoes being prosecuted for aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony. [Id.] Beddoes fought this charge in court. [Id.] The charge was 
ultimately reduced to a misdemeanor count of reckless endangerment. [Id.] Beddoes 
obtained an acquittal at trial. [Id.] He then initiated this case against Giffm. [Id.] The 
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matter is now before this Court on appeal. 
R Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition: 
At the trial court level, Giffin filed a motion for summary judgment on June 13, 
2005. [R. at 43-45.] After Beddoes submitted a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion [R. at 123-146], the matter was set down for oral argument on September 2, 2005. 
[R. at 195.] Following argument, the trial court determined that Giffin did not actively 
initiate criminal proceedings against Beddoes, thus negating one of the essential elements 
of a prima facie claim of malicious prosecution. [R. at 244.] Consequently, the trial 
court entered summary judgment in Giffin's favor, thereby dismissing Beddoes' 
complaint. [R. at 244, 196-197.] The trial court's ruling was subsequently reduced to 
judgment on September 22, 2005. [R. at 196-197.] 
Shortly thereafter, on September 29, 2005, Giffin filed a timely request for an 
award of court costs. [R. at 198-210.] Beddoes opposed this request, deeming it 
improper and unsupported. [R. at 211-213.] On November 2, 2005, the trial court 
entered a Minute Entry agreeing with Beddoes' position and denying Giffin's cost 
request. [R. at 220-221.] That Minute Entry was subsequently reduced to an Order on 
November 28, 2005. [R. at 227-228.] Beddoes then initiated the instant appeal by filing 
a notice of appeal on December 22, 2005. [R. at 229-230.] 
C Court of Appeals Proceedings & the Disposition Below: 
Jurisdiction over this appeal was originally with the Utah Supreme Court. [A copy 
of the appellate docket in this case is attached at Appendix E.] On December 29, 2005, 
this Court entered an Order transferring the case to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. [Appendix B.] Thereafter, on January 17, 2006, Giffin filed a motion for 
summaiy disposition, asserting that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the 
appeal. [Appendix E.] Giffm claimed that the final judgment in this case was entered 
below on September 22, 2005 (the summaiy judgment order), not on November 28, 2005 
(the cost denial order). Beddoes filed a memorandum in opposition to Giffin's motion for 
summaiy disposition, asserting that the order of November 28, 2005, was the final 
judgment. [Id.] 
The court of appeals took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a 
Memorandum Decision on March 30, 2006. [Beddoes v. Giffin, 2006 UT App 130; 
Appendix A.] The court of appeals agreed with Giffin's position, concluding that the 
summaiy judgment order of September 22, 2005, was the final judgment in this case, not 
the order of November 28, 2005, even though the September order left in controversy a 
dispute as to the recoverability of court costs. [Id.] The court of appeals therefore 
dismissed Beddoes' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. [Id.] 
Beddoes subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court on April 
28, 2006. Said petition was granted on July 17, 2006. [Appendix B.] 
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D. Statement of Facts; 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals granted summary disposition and did not reach 
the merits of this case, the only facts relevant to the questions presented for review herein 
are the procedural facts set forth above. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
To conserve judicial resources, and to provide a clear, consistent, and uniform 
approach to the final judgment mle, this Court should conclude that a timely filed request 
for court costs delays entry of judgment for purposes of appeal, until the cost request 
matter is resolved. Adopting this approach conserves judicial resources by allowing all 
appealable issues in a case to be handled in a single notice of appeal, rather than by 
requiring a second, separate notice of appeal to address the cost request determination. 
Further, this approach fosters clarity and consistency in the appellate process by affording 
equal treatment to collateral matters of attorney fees and court costs, arising at or near the 
entry of judgment. 
Utah law already delays entiy of a final judgment to allow collateral attorney fee 
issues to be resolved at the trial court level, prior to permitting an appeal. This Court 
should apply the same mle to collateral court cost matters. There is no good, compelling 
reason for the Court to draw a distinction between these two collateral issues. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS NOT INVOKED UNTIL 
ALL CONTESTED ISSUES ARE RESOLVED AT THE TRIAL 
COURT LEVEL 
It is axiomatic that an appeal may only be taken after entry of a final judgment. 
See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 3. A judgment is not final until it ends the controversy 
between the parties. Loffredo v. Holt 37 P.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Utah 2001). To qualify as 
a final judgment, it is not enough for a judgment to dispose of most of the claims in 
dispute in a case; instead, it must dispose of all of the claims of all of the parties. Id. 
In this jurisdiction, the notion of what constitutes a final judgment has recently 
undergone a fundamental change. A shift in emphasis has occurred, whereby the 
principle of judicial economy in the appeals process has been elevated to the forefront. 
The overriding concern of this shift in emphasis has been an effort to conserve scarce 
judicial resources by requiring all appealable issues in a case to be presented and resolved 
in a single notice of appeal. This is in sharp contrast to the old approach of requiring 
litigants to separately appeal collateral matters that are adjudicated following entry of a 
judgment on the merits. 
The old approach to the final judgment rule is expressed in Taylor v. Hansen, 958 
P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). At issue in Taylor was the timeliness of an appeal that 
had been brought following entry of a judgment on the merits, leaving a dispute at the 
trial court level as to how much should be awarded in attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. In resolving this issue, the court of appeals looked to federal law for guidance. It 
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noted that in the federal system, a judgment is deemed final for puiposes of invoking 
appellate jurisdiction when it resolves the underlying merits of the case, regardless of 
whether there remains in controversy any dispute over collateral issues such as court 
costs and attorney fees. Id. at 926-27. The court of appeals elected to adopt this 
approach. It stated: "Our adoption of this rule will eliminate uncertainty about the 
propriety of filing a notice of appeal when attorney fee issues are unresolved and avoid 
problematic situations when a party may delay or never apply for a quantification of 
fees." Id. at 927-928. 
Arguably, the Taylor approach to the final judgment rule remained good law in 
Utah for only 12 days. Almost immediately after its release, Taylor was supplanted by 
this Court's contrary holding in Meadowbrook v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998). 
While not explicitly overruling Taylor, the Meadowbrook court clearly undertook a 
different approach to interpreting and applying the final judgment rule. 
In Meadowbrook. this Court tackled the issue of whether a prevailing party at trial 
had waived its right to request attorney fees, where such fees were first requested in a 
post-trial motion filed before entry of judgment. Rejecting the federal approach that had 
been adopted in Taylor, this Court concluded that judicial economy in the appeals process 
would not be served by construing the final judgment rule narrowly to exclude 
disposition of collateral matters such as the recoverability of attorney fees. The Court 
stated that separating such collateral matters from the underlying merits of a case would 
waste judicial resources by requiring multiple, piecemeal appeals. The Court reasoned as 
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follows: 
[A] party who appeals the judgment on the underlying merits may also 
wish to appeal the attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a 
motion for such fees to be brought after the time for filing an appeal 
on the original judgment has expired, the appellant would have to file 
a second appeal based upon the attorney fee award. Judicial 
economy during the appeals process would not be furthered in any 
way by requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a party's 
decision to appeal on the underlying merits may largely depend upon 
the size of the attorney fee award. ... Absent a rule or statutory 
provision to the contrary, the rule we adopt today prevents a party 
from bringing a post-judgment motion for attorney fees and will 
generally enable an appellant to appeal all issues, including an award 
of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal. 
Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
It did not take long for the issues involved in Taylor and Meadowbrook to 
resurface. In ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 2000 UT 4, this Court had 
occasion to revisit Meadowbrook, and to compare its approach with the competing 
approach established in Taylor. The Court ultimately concluded that the Meadowbrook 
approach was the better reasoned approach. It stated: 
We are aware that in Taylor v. Hanson, 958 P.2d 923, 927 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), the court of appeals adopted the rule enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
486 U.S. 196, 108 S. Ct. 1717, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1998). ... We 
decline to follow that rule. Instead, we follow the principle set out in 
Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1998). ... 
It will save the resources of the parties and this court if the issue of 
attorney fees can be determined in the same appeal in which the 
merits of the underlying judgment are examined. Otherwise, a 
second appeal must be taken to challenge the amount of attorney 
fees awarded subsequent to the judgment on the merits and then 
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examined in the light of the judgment on the merits. This would be 
wasteful. We therefore hold that, in the interest of judicial economy, 
a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to 
a party before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an 
appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will 
serve both litigants and this court well, by "enabling] an appellant to 
appeal all issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single 
notice of appeal." Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 119. 
2000 UT 4, ffif 13-14 (emphasis added). 
To remove any lingering doubt about the continued vitality of Taylor, this Court 
expressly overruled Taylor in Sittner v. Schrieven 2 P.3d 923, 2000 UT 45. In doing so, 
the Court concluded that a judgment that failed to fix the amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded was not a final judgment. 2000 UT 45, f 19. The principle of judicial economy 
in the appellate process was thus once again upheld. 
One year later, this Court again examined Meadowbrook and decided, yet again, to 
uphold its approach to the final judgment rule. This time the Court invoked it to bar a 
premature appeal. The occasion was Loffredo v. Holt 37 P.3d 1070, 2001 UT 97. In 
Loffredo, this Court dismissed an appeal that had been taken of a judgment that had not 
yet disposed of a dispute over attorney fees and court costs. Again, this Court 
emphasized the need for litigants to conserve scarce judicial resources by complying with 
the final judgment rule and not bring an appeal until all contested issues in the case had 
been decided at the trial court level. 
Loffredo makes clear that only final judgments are appealable, and that an appeal 
will be dismissed if it is commenced prematurely. In succinct but direct fashion, the 
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Loffredo Court summed up the final judgment rule as follows: "Generally speaking, the 
rule prevents a party from prematurely appealing a non-final judgment, and thereby 
preserves scarce judicial resources. ... For an order to constitute a final judgment, it must 
end the controversy between the litigants. In other words, to be considered a final order, 
the trial court's decision must dispose of the claims of all parties.'1 2001 UT 97, ffij 11-
12. Continuing on, the Court added: "We stress that the final judgment rule does not 
stand for the proposition that the lower court need only resolve the majority of the claims 
for us to entertain the case. Rather, it requires that all claims, including requests for 
attorney fees, be decided in order for a decision to be appropriately appealed to this court. 
Strict compliance with this principle is necessary to preserve 4the interests] of 
judicial economy.'" Id. at ^ 14 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
It is against this backdrop that the instant appeal was commenced. At the trial 
court level, Beddoes found himself on the losing end of a motion for summary judgment, 
which he wished to appeal. However, within seven days after entiy of that judgment, 
Beddoes was hit with a timely request for an award of court costs, which he wished to 
oppose. At this juncture, he was confronted with a decision. Should he commence an 
immediate appeal of the summary judgment order, which disposed of the underlying 
merits of the case but not the collateral issue of court costs, or should he hold off on 
appealing the summary judgment decision until after the cost request matter was 
resolved? If he chose to file an immediate appeal, would he then have to file a second 
appeal if he subsequently received an adverse ruling on the cost request matter, not 
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having the omniscient power to know how this issue would turn out? 
Faced with these questions, Beddoes chose the only course consistent with the 
spirit, puipose, and intent of the final judgment mle as expressed in Meadowbrook and its 
progeny. Before commencing an appeal, he waited for the trial court to end the 
controversy between the parties by disposing of the cost request issue. Once this issue 
had been adjudicated, Beddoes then commenced the instant appeal. 
As it turned out, the court of appeals concluded that Beddoes chose the wrong 
course. Remarkably, the court accepted Giffm's argument that the summary judgment 
order was the final judgment in the case, not the order disposing of Griffin's request for 
court costs. Referring to two cases that state, in dictum, that court costs can be added to a 
judgment without effecting its finality,1 the court of appeals concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Beddoes' appeal. 
The decision of the court of appeals is erroneous as a matter of law. Such decision 
runs counter to the final judgment mle as expressed in Meadowbrook and its progeny, 
and hearkens back to the days of Taylor, requiring litigants to file separate, multiple 
appeals to address issues of collateral import. The net effect of the decision is to 
undeimine the principle of judicial economy in the appeals process by requiring multiple 
appeals in the same case, one devoted to challenging the merits of the case and another 
'These cases, Nielson v. Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and ProMax 
Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000), are discussed more fully in Argument II 
below. 
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devoted to challenging a subsequent cost determination.2 To correct this erroneous 
application of the final judgment rule, Beddoes respectfully asks this Court to reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
IL BEDDOES' APPEAL WAS DISMISSED ON THE BASIS OF 
INAPPOSITE CASE LAW AND DICTUM 
In dismissing Beddoes' appeal, the court of appeals latched on to certain dictum in 
two cases-Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and ProMax Dev. 
Coip. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254-to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal. The court of appeals relied upon these cases to establish the following 
proposition: "when ... no attorney fees are involved but only court costs, which are 
usually small statutory amounts or liquidated amounts, such costs can be added later to a 
judgment without affecting its finality." Promax. 2000 UT 4 at [^12. 
With all due respect to the court of appeals, this proposition should not have been 
2Court costs are not "subsumed" in the underlying judgment, as Giffin argued 
before the court of appeals by citing to a federal case inteipreting the final judgment rule, 
California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Sav. Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 567 (9th Cir. 
1991). Giffin's reliance on federal case law was misplaced, because the federal approach 
to the final judgment rule was expressly rejected by this Court in Meadowbrook and its 
progeny. Beddoes has been unable to find any Utah case law on point. However, in 
researching this issue he did find a case from California, Norman I. King Real Estate 
Investments, Inc.. v. Praszker. 269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1990), wherein 
the following statement is made: fcCA postjudgment order which awards or denies costs or 
attorney's fees is separately appealable, ... and if no appeal is taken from such an order, 
the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review it." (Citations omitted; copy attached at 
Appendix Q) 
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applied to dismiss Beddoes' appeal. While on its face it may seem applicable, upon 
closer examination it is actually not. There are sharp, fundamental distinctions between 
the instant case and the Nielson and ProMax cases. These distinctions cannot be squared. 
As more fully demonstrated below, it was erroneous as a matter of law for the court of 
appeals to rely upon the dictum in Nielson and ProMax as a basis for dismissing 
Beddoes' appeal. 
A. Nielson Is Inapposite 
Simply stated, Nielson is inapposite to the case at bar. In contrast with the instant 
case, Nielson involved an appeal arising from a modified judgment. The modified 
judgment merely recited, as a clerical matter, that the prevailing party was entitled to an 
award of court costs. The nature and substance of the underlying judgment was not 
modified in any way. Moreover, it does not appeal* that Nielson involved any dispute 
over the recoverability or amount court costs. These are key distinctions between Nielson 
and the instant case. 
Because Nielson involved a modified judgment, it was disposed of in accordance 
with the umodified judgment rule." Under this rule, when a judgment is entered that is 
subsequently modified by a later judgment, a detennination must be made as to which 
judgment is the final one for puiposes of appeal. In making this detennination, the 
modified judgment rule requires an inquiiy into the nature and scope of the modification. 
If the modification alters the character and substance of the original judgment, then it 
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becomes the final judgment for puiposes of appeal. However, if the subject modification 
is merely clerical in nature, then the original judgment is controlling for puiposes of 
appeal. See, e.g.. Nielson. 888 P.2d at 132 (citing cases and authorities applying the 
modified judgment rule). 
In Nielson, the modification in question merely recited that the prevailing party 
was entitled to an award of court costs. No argument was made over the amount of such 
costs. Further, no argument was made as to whether such costs were appropriately 
recoverable. 
The instant case is quite different. Unlike Nielson, no modification of a judgment 
is involved. Hence, the instant case is outside the scope of the modified judgment rule. 
Equally important, the instant case involves a dispute at the trial court level as to the 
appropriateness of an award of court costs. Here, as opposed to Nielson, court costs were 
contested and ultimately denied. Consequently, Nielson has veiy little application to the 
issues in the instant appeal. It should also be noted that Nielson was decided several 
years prior to this Court's seminal decision in Meadowbrook, which fundamentally 
altered the landscape in Utah for puiposes of applying the final judgment rule. For the 
foregoing reasons, it was en* for the court of appeals to invoke Nielson as a basis for 
dismissing the instant appeal. 
B. ProMax Was Misapplied 
The court of appeals also erred in applying ProMax to dismiss Beddoes' appeal. 
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As indicated above, ProMax is one of this Court's recent decisions construing the final 
judgment rule. It upholds Meadowbrook by requiring strict adherence to the final 
judgment rule in order to conserve scarce judicial resources and prevent premature 
appeals. Although ProMax refened to Nielson as authority for the proposition that court 
costs can be added to a judgment without affecting its finality, such reference was purely 
dictum. On balance, the holding of ProMax clearly favors Beddoes' position. 
The precise issue in ProMax was whether a judgment that awarded court costs, but 
which failed to fix the amount of such costs, was final. Before an appeal had been 
commenced, the trial court conducted a hearing on the taxation of costs, and then 
awarded court costs and attomey fees to the prevailing party. The court subsequently 
modified the judgment to increase the award of attorney fees. In doing so, it omitted any 
mention of court costs. An appeal was then commenced, and the issue of appellate 
jurisdiction was raised as to which judgment in the case was the final judgment for 
purposes of appeal. 
Because ProMax involved an appeal from a modified order, the modified judgment 
rule was appropriately applied to determine the timeliness of the appeal. In this respect, 
the case is similar to Nielson. However, unlike Nielson. the modified judgment was 
deemed to be the final judgment, with the Court concluding that the modified judgment 
had sufficiently altered the character and substance of the original judgment so as to 
delay invocation of the final judgment rule. In arriving at this result, the Court stated: 
"Where attorney fees are awarded to a party, whether denominated as an item of 'costs' 
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or not, and the amount is not stated in the judgment rendered on the merits of the case, 
and evidence must be taken afterwards by the trial court either by affidavit or live 
testimony, there is no final judgment for the purposes of appeal until the amount of the 
fees has been ascertained and granted. However, when, as in Nielson, no attorney fees 
are involved but only court costs, which are usually small statutory amounts or liquidated 
amounts, such costs can be added later to a judgment without affecting its finality." 
ProMax, 2000 UT 4 at f^ 12. 
Whereas ProMax concerned a dispute over the recoverability of court costs and 
attorney fees, the instant case deals only with court costs. Does it then fall within the 
scope of the Nielson proposition that court costs can be added to a judgment without 
affecting its finality? It does not. This proposition does not apply here for several 
reasons. First, court costs were not awarded in the instant case. Instead, Beddoes 
vigorously challenged an award of costs. This did not occur in Nielson. Ultimately, the 
trial court deemed an award of costs to be improper. Hence, the instant case is veiy 
factually different than Nielson. Moreover, the instant case does not involve a modified 
judgment, as opposed to the modified judgments at issue in both Nielson and ProMax. 
The bottom line is that the superfluous language in Nielson and ProMax addressing the 
issue of adding small, undisputed statutoiy court costs to a judgment without affecting its 
finality, is simply inapposite to the instant case. 
It has long been recognized that tC[t]he right to an appeal is a valuable and 
constitutional right [that] ought not to be denied except where it is clear the right has been 
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lost or abandoned." Adamson v. Brockbank. 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947). Beddoes' 
constitutional right to pursue an appeal should not be deprived on the basis of such 
suspect authority. The memorandum decision of the court of appeals dismissing 
Beddoes' appeal is not a correct statement of the law. It guts the final judgment rule as 
established in Meadowbrook by undeimining the ability of parties to bring all appealable 
issues in a case in a single notice of appeal. The dictum relied upon by the court of 
appeals in dismissing Beddoes' appeal was simply misapplied. This Court should 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate Beddoes' appeal. 
III. THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON TO DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES IN 
CONSTRUING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE 
The end result of the memorandum decision of the court of appeals is to create a 
distinction between court costs and attorney fees in applying the final judgment rule. 
The court of appeals would treat as non-final a judgment that disposes of all issues in a 
case except a contioversy over attorney fees. However, the court of appeals would treat 
that same judgment as final where it disposes of everything but court costs. On its face, 
this distinction appears artificial. It is not only artificial but flawed. 
For puiposes of applying the final judgment rule, this Court has already rejected a 
distinction between judgments that resolve the merits of a case, and judgments that 
resolve subsequent collateral issues of attorney fees. See Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 119. 
In ProMax. this Court reiterated its opposition to such a distinction, summarizing its 
17 
stance as follows: 
As pointed out in Meadowbrook [959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998)], a 
party's decision to appeal the underlying merits may often depend 
upon the size of the attomey fees awarded. We there addressed the 
appropriate timing for parties' requests for attomey fees. While not 
strictly apposite to the instant case, our reasoning there is useful. 
Explaining our holding we presented the following model: '[A] party 
who appeals the judgment on the underlying merits may also wish to 
appeal the attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a motion for 
usch fees to be brought after the time for filing an appeal on the 
original judgment has expired, the appellant would have to file a 
second appeal based upon the attomey fee award. Judicial economy 
during the appeals process would not be furthered in any way by 
requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a party's decision to 
appeal on the underlying merits may largely depend upon the size of 
the attorney fee award.' Applied to the instant case, this reasoning is 
sound. It will save the resources of the parties and this court if the 
issue of attorney fees can be determined in the same appeal in which 
the merits of the underlying judgment are examined. Otherwise, a 
second appeal must be taken to challenge the amount of attorney fees 
awarded subsequent to the judgment on the merits and then examined 
in the light of the judgment on the merits. This would be wasteful. 
We therefore hold that, in the interest of judicial economy, a 
trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a 
party before the judgment becomes final for the puiposes of an appeal 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will serve 
both litigants and this court well, by c enabling] an appellant to bring 
all issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of 
appeal' Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 119. 
Proinax, 2000 UT 4, fflf 14-15. 
If the term "court costs" is substituted in place of the term "attorney fees" in the 
foregoing citation, the reasoning, logic, and holding of the case remains exactly the same. 
As such, there is no compelling reason for any distinction to be made between post-
judgment costs and post-judgment attomey fees. These two collateral issues should 
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receive equal, identical treatment. To hold otherwise is to undermine Meadowbrook and 
its progeny, and to wreak havoc with the principle of judicial economy in the appeals 
process. 
When this Court stated in Meadowbrook that all appealable issues in a case should 
be brought in a single notice of appeal, it must be assumed that the Court meant what it 
said. Giffin, however, would have this Court alter the wording of Meadowbrook and 
have the decision read as follows: all appealable issues in a case should be brought in a 
single notice of appeal, except contested issues involving post-judgment court costs, 
which should be addressed and handled in second and separate notice of appeal. Giffin's 
alternate rendering of Meadowbrook is simply not warranted. 
Where costs remain in dispute at the trial court level, this Court should apply the 
final judgment rule consistent with Meadowbrook and find that there is no final judgment 
in a case until after the dispute is resolved. See Loffredo, 37 P.3d at 1072-73 (concluding 
there is no final judgment until attorney fees and court costs are resolved).3 
Economically speaking, it makes good common sense for the final judgment rule to be 
3Loffredo provides strong authority for Beddoes' position herein, inasmuch as it 
involved court costs and attorney fees still pending at the trial court level when the appeal 
was commenced. This Court deemed the Loffredo appeal premature, stating that it 
should not have been brought until the controversy between the parties had been brought 
to an end. ProMax is similar, in that it involved an appeal arising from a post-judgment 
dispute over attorney fees, which the lower court initially taxed as an item of court costs. 
Giffin would have this Court either overlook Loffredo and ProMax. or otherwise limit 
their holdings to cases where only attorney fees are left unresolved at the trial court level, 
as opposed to court costs. Giffm's approach is unsound, and would only create confusion 
in the appellate process, not clarity. 
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inteipreted so as to allow a party to challenge a cost request determination in the same 
notice of appeal that also addresses the underlying merits of the case. Such a rule would 
conserve litigation resources by avoiding duplication in appellate fees ($205 filing fee 
instead of $410), duplication in cost bonds ($300 instead of $600), duplication in attorney 
fees (which, alone, can be cost prohibitive), and duplication in court resources. This is 
particularly important when the amount of costs in controversy is small (e.g., less than 
$300 in the instant case). A contrary result would have a chilling effect on litigants who 
wish to appeal a small cost award as well as an unfavorable judgment on the merits of the 
case, but who cannot economically justify the costs of filing two separate appeals in such 
situations. 
Cost deteiminations are often appealed. Indeed, on occasion they are important 
enough to be the only issue in a case meriting an appeal. See, e.g., Fielden v. Hansen, 
2005 UT App 426 (per curiam, unpublished opinion vacating an improperly entered cost 
award of $194.88 for trial exhibits (copy attached at Appendix O)). Where, however, a 
litigant wishes to appeal both the underlying judgment and an adverse cost award (or, 
perhaps more accurately stated, where a litigant may need to appeal both matters), the 
most economical, sensible, and expeditious solution is to allow the litigant to appeal both 
matters in a single appeal.4 
4Cost requests are required within 5 days after entry of a judgment. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54 (d)(2). This requirement seemingly allows for the lower court to quickly assess the 
appropriateness of the request and giant or deny the request in an expeditious fashion. 
However, even under the best of circumstances it is unlikely that a contested cost request 
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Simply stated, there is no compelling reason for costs to be treated differently than 
attorney iocs. ^,,t;i manors warrant equal treatment , .nying the ;..::.w .. .lugmLiu 
I i ile to be th issi les creates cei taint} in the appellate pi c • :ess. t IC t confusw " i'iu - • !.: v 
guidance to litigants who sometimes struggle with the difficult decision of when to 
appropriately commence an appeal. 
appeal was timely filed. It should therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
j 11 • •; •: i nstate Beddoes' appeal forthwith. 
CONCLUSION' 
The principle of judicial economy in the appeals process would not be served by 
distinguishing between post-judgment court costs and post-judgment attorney fees. 
will be decided and reduce a 10 judgment within 30 days after entry of the una^ > 
ji idgment, considering the initial 5-day time frame permitted for filing the cost ,n, - ^ 
plus time for mailing, the 10-day period permitted for filing an opposition to the cost 
request plus time for mailing, the 5-day period for filing a reply memorandum plus time 
for mailing, the time it takes to file a request for a decision, the time it takes tor the court 
to rule on the cost request and submit a minute entry on the matter, the time it takes for 
the prevailing party to prepare and circulate a proposed order on the matter plus time for 
mailing, the 5-day period permitted for the nonprevailing party to file an objection to the 
proposed order plus time for mailing, and the time frame for the court to execute the 
order, not including any intervening holidays or weekends that may add additional time to 
the foregoing time hints, nor factoring any additional time for oral argument or a hearing 
to be held regarding the matter. Consequently, under Giffin and the court of appeals' 
rationale, a party who wishes to appeal an unfavorable cost award and also contest the 
underlying judgment would invariably have to file two separa te notices of appeal in the 
case. This is extremely wastefi il. 
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Instead of treating these two collateral matters differently, they should be treated the 
same. Thus, in deciding whether a post-judgment request for court costs should delay 
entry of judgment for puiposes of appeal, this Court should adhere to the final judgment 
rule laid down in Meadowbrook and its progeny, and require that all timely presented and 
contested collateral matters be first disposed of at the trial court level before appellate 
jurisdiction is invoked. This consistent approach to the final judgment mle conserves 
scarce judicial resources and allows for all appealable issues to be brought and resolved 
in a single notice of appeal. 
In the case at bar, this Court should find that Beddoes complied with the final 
judgment mle by awaiting disposition of Giffin's timely filed post-judgment cost request, 
prior to commencing an appeal. In so finding, this Court should reinstate Beddoes' 
appeal and reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
DATED: °i b / ° & MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
William P. Morrison 
Grant W. P. Monison 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
>oOoo 
* „* - — .., , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gary Giffin, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
MEMORANDUM UEC^S^uL 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case ' - -nnciiS4-CA 
(March 30, ?C"^5) 
2006 UT App 130 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 04 0907525 
The Honorabl e A nthony B . Qi ] i n n 
Attorneys; William, P. Morrison and Grant W P, Morrison, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Sean A. Monson, Salt Lake city, for Appellee • 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Bi llings 
Appe.lee Gary Giffin moves to dismiss this appeal for lack 
isdiction and also seeks sanctions under rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedui ^ 
i^i ~ • . . -^., L,.^  ^ .wi^w ~~. w entered an order 
granting ^^\.>^:\ 1,...-. jment and dismissing Beddoes's complaint with 
prejudice on the merits. On September 29, 2005, Giffin moved for 
an award of costs under rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, On November 2, 2 005, the district court denied the 
request in a signed minute entry, Beddoes prepared a formal 
order, which was signed and filed on November 28, 2005. Beddoes 
filed a notice of appeal from, the summary judgment on December 
22, ,2005. Giffin argues that the appeal must be dismissed 
because the September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment, 
rather than the November 28, 2005 order denying costs, was the 
final, appealable judgment. 
The jurisdictional issue is addressed in ProMax Dev. Corp. 
v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, and Nielson v. Gurley, 88 8 
P.2d 13 0 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), In Nielson, we stated that an 
amendment to a judgment clarifying that the prevailing party vs •-
entitled to recover costs "did not create a new judgment for 
purposes of determining the timeliness of appeal, and the time 
[for] appeal commenced to run from the date of the original 
judgment." Nielson, 888 P.2d at 133. In ProMax, the Utah 
Supreme Court denied a motion to dismiss an appeal filed after 
entry of an order awarding a liquidated amount of attorney fees, 
but more than thirty days after the original judgment dismissed 
the complaint on the merits. The supreme court concluded: 
Where attorney fees are awarded to a party, 
whether denominated as an item of "costs11 or 
not, and the amount is not stated in the 
judgment rendered on the merits of the case, 
and evidence must be taken afterwards by the 
trial court either by affidavit or live 
testimony, there is no final judgment for the 
purposes of appeal until the amount of the 
fees has been ascertained and granted. 
However, when, as in Nielson, no attorney 
fees are involved but only court costs, which 
are usually small statutory amounts or 
liquidated amounts, such costs can be added 
later to a judgment without affecting its 
finality. 
Promax, 2000 UT 4 at 1[l2. 
The September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment and 
dismissing Beddoes's claims was the final, appealable judgment. 
As the prevailing party, Giffin sought to recover costs under 
rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, 
Giffin did not seek an award of attorney fees. The addition of 
costs to the judgment, if the request had been granted, would not 
have affected the finality of the September 22 order for purposes 
of appeal. Because Beddoes}s notice of appeal was not filed 
within thirty days after entry of final judgment, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
In support of the request for sanctions under rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, counsel for Giffin asserts 
that he wrote to counsel for Beddoes stating that the appeal was 
not timely and also stating his intention to seek sanctions under 
rule 33 if the appeal was not voluntarily dismissed. Beddoes!s 
counsel declined to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Giffin seeks 
an award of attorney fees as a sanction for filing a frivolous 
appeal. Although Beddoes' s arguments are inconsistent with both 
ProMax and Nielson, we liberally construe them as good faith 
arguments for a modification of the existing case law and deny 
Giffin's request for sanctions on that basis. 
20051154-CA 2 
We dismiss the appeal for lack ot jurisdiction but deny the 
request for sanctions under -^' <- "< -^ "he Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
j&**s£M 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
/%***<& *A* ^^tKJL^tju^X/ 
Pamela T, Greenwood, 
As soc iate Pres idina 




OFf 9 CI *MK 
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Wi 11 Ian: t, G " Dc A' ::l es, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
^ 7 , Case 
• L 0 Q 0 7 S 7 R 
Gary Giffin, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
ORDER 
P i ;i rsuant to Section 7 8- 2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, and effeeti ve 
twenty days from the date of this order, this matter will be 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
Thereafter, al"l further pleadings and correspondence should be 
directed to that court. Prior to the effective date of the 
transfer, this court is willing to consider retaining this matter 
on its own docket. Accordingly, any party to the appeal may 
submit a letter to the court regarding the appropriateness of 
retention. The letter shall contain a concise statement of the 
issues presented on appeal and a brief explanation of the reasons 
supporting retention or transfer. The letter shall not exceed 
five pages and must be received within ten calendar day s of the 
date of this order. In the event the tenth day falls on a 
weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the first 
business day thereafter. Following transfer to the Court of 
Appeals, the parties may not move for recall of the transfer, but 
this court may, on its own motion, vacate an order of transfer. 
This order does not alter or affect the independent requirements 
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Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
yf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December ^ , 2005, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
GRANT W. P. MORRISON 
WILLIAM PATRICK MORRISON 
MORRISON & MORRISON LC 
352 E 900 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
SEAN A MONSON 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC 
10 EXCHANGE PL 
3RD FL NEWHOUSE BLDG 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the trial court listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
By L\fr$ffi&T\ 
Deputy Clerk \-/ l^  J 
Case No. 20051154-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 040907525 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT? 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 JUL • ? 2006 
William G. Beddoes, 
Petitioner, 




This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on April 28, 2006. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue: 
"Whether a motion for an award of costs, filed after the 
entry of judgment, delays the entry of judgment for purposes of 
appeal until the motion is resolved." 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
For The Cour t : 
Dated /% ?fit6 
Christine M."Durham 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 18, 2006, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered 
to the parties listed below: 
GRANT W. P. MORRISON 
WILLIAM PATRICK MORRISON 
MORRISON & MORRISON LC 
352 E 900 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
SEAN A MONSON 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC 
10 EXCHANGE PL 
3RD FL NEWHOUSE BLDG 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LISA COLLINS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this July 18, 2 006. 
,<wvgV"~ fULe^^v^cU-&--<—) By 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20060389 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20051154 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 040907525 
Appendix C 
c o p y 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW 
&BEDNARLLC 
Sean A. Monson, #7261 
Third Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5678 
Facsimile: (801)364-5678 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040907525 
Judge Quinn 
On Friday, September 2,2005, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing pursuant to notice. PlaintiffWilliam G. Beddoes was represented by counsel, Wffiamrfr 
Morrison; Defendant Gary Giffin was represented by counsel, Sean A. Monson. The Court, having 
considered the written memoranda submitted by counsel and the oral arguments of the parties, for 
good cause appearing, hereby ORDERS as follows: 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Complaint and all 
claims asserted therein are dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. The Plaintiff has not 
demonstrated that Defendant initiated the criminal proceedmg against Plaintiff, as required to assert 
a claim for malicious prosecution. 
DATED this "22tifcv of September, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE ^  
f 
ANTHONY QUTNN 
Approved as to form: 
William P. Morrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
G \giO06G5\20 BeddoesUudgmcut wpd 2 
W i l l i a m P. Morrison (7587) 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f 
352 Eas t 900 South 
S a l t Lake C i ty , UT 84111 
T e l : 801/359-7999 
By 
FILEO I H * T » I ? T mmi 
Th'0 Js.-"''r;Lj! Cstrict 
NOV 2 8 2005 
SALTLAfcS*Ge«NTY 
Deputy Clerk 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR COSTS 
Civil No.: 040907525 
Judge: QUINN 
This matter came before the Court on defendant's request for 
costs. The Court, having duly considered the request for costs, 
the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the request, and all 
other pleadings and documents on file, and oral argument not 
having been requested, now for good cause showing it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendant's cost request is 
denied. The requested costs are not recoverable costs under Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Costs for photo 
copies are generally not recoverable, and there is no authority 
for awarding costs for transcripts of a coll^^Uag^^pding. 
DATED: //~''2~^C "Ofc BY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & NOTICE TO PARTIES: 
This certifies that on the tZ^ day of tJQVt+t^tvL* 2005, 
I caused to be served, via first-class mail, postage-prepaid, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying 
Defendant's Request for Costs to the following: 
Sean A. Monson 
Manning Curtis Bradshaw 
Attorney for Defendant 
Third Floor Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
* Notice to interested parties: If you have any objection 
to the proposed Order, such objection must be filed within 5 days 
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Parker M. NIELSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Dale GURLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 930327-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 21,1994. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 30,1995. 
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Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant. 
Daniel D. Darger, Salt Lake City, for 
appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Associate Presiding Judge. 
Dale Giirley. an employee of the State of 
Utah, appeals the trial court's judgment in favor 
of Parker M. Nielson. We vacate the judgment 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
Nielson trains hunting dogs as a hobby. To 
facilitate his hobby. Nielson obtained a permit 
from the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
(DWR) and negotiated a special use lease 
agreement with the State of Utah. Division of 
State Lands and Forestry, for the purpose of 
"releasing and propagating gamebirds for 
hunting dog training" During the morning of 
September 8. 1990. Nielson was training his 
dogs on the leased property with chukar 
partridges. Nielson completed his activities and 
left the area around 10:00 a.m. 
On the same day. Gurley, a wildlife 
conservation officer employed by DWR. was 
patrolling in the area of Nielson's leasehold, 
checking on hunters on the opening weekend of 
the hunting season for grouse, chukar. and 
r 
l a s t : . <?bL 
cottontail rabbit. That afternoon, Gurley forcibly 
entered a locked bird pen belonging to Nielson. 
The pen was part of Nielson's licensed game 
farm. As a result of Gurley's conduct, the chukar 
within the pen escaped. Gurley then dismantled 
a device designed to recapture gamebirds and 
rendered the pen unusable. Gurley also 
confiscated bird feed, feeders, identification 
bands, and watering devices. Gurley did not 
secure a warrant and did not make an arrest or 
issue a citation. 
On September 1SL 1990. a mere ten days 
after the incident, Nielson. a licensed attorney, 
filed a complaint alleging that Gurley converted 
his property, tortiously interfered with his 
contract with the State, and defamed him. 1 
Upon being served, Gurley prepared a report of 
the incident and fabricated a citation against 
Nielson, later falsely claiming hi his affidavit in 
opposition to Nielson's motion for partial 
summary judgment that he mailed the citation to 
Nielson. Gurley admitted at trial that he had not 
actually issued a citation to Nielson, nor had he 
ever intended to do so. 
On April 9. 1991. Nielson filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment. The trial court 
granted the motion, holding that Gurley had 
acted without probable cause and that his 
conduct was unlawful. The trial court also 
granted Nielson's motion to strike Gurley's 
affidavit because it was "riddled with untruths." 
Subsequently, Nielson filed a second action 
against Gurley. The two actions were 
consolidated, as both involved the same parties. 
the same transaction, the same damages, and 
identical allegations, except that the second 
complaint sought an injunction to prevent 
defendant from interfering with plaintiffs dog-
training activities. The case proceeded to trial 
after which the court entered judgment against 
Gurley for $2300, found to be the replacement 
value of Nielson's property, plus $15,000 in 
attorney fees pursuant to Utah's bad faith statute. 
See Utah Code Aim. § 78-27-56(1) (1992). 
Gurley asks us to reverse the trial court's 
ruling on numerous grounds, including lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, governmental 
immunity, misinterpretation of Utah Wildlife 
statutes and regulations, improper entry of 
Page 132 
summary judgment, improper award of attorney 
fees to a pro se litigant, and improper award of 
bad faith attorney fees. 2 
TIMELINESS OF APPEAL 
Before reaching the merits of Gurley's 
appeal, we must first determine whether we have 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Nielson argues that 
Gurley failed to file notice of appeal within 
thirty days following the trial court's entry of 
final judgment, and that we must therefore 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 
Utah R.App.P. 4(a). 
Of course, we cannot take jurisdiction over 
an untimely appeal. Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 
390. 392 (Utah 1983). In fact, "[w]hen a matter 
is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only 
the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-
Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 
(Utah App.1989). However, "[tjhe right to an 
appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and 
ought not to be denied except where it is clear 
the right has been lost or abandoned." Adamson 
v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52. 60. 185 P.2d 264. 
268 (1947). 
The chronology of the proceedings below is 
critical in determining whether we have 
C 
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jurisdiction to hear this appeal. On June 24, 
1991. the trial court entered partial summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of 
liability. On October 21 and 22, 1992, trial was 
held on the remaining issues of conversion, 
interference with contract, and damages. On 
December 18. 1992, the trial court, by 
memorandum decision, awarded plaintiff $2300 
in damages and $15,000 for attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) 
(1992). On the same day, by minute entry, the 
trial court indicated it would "retain jurisdiction 
over this matter until the final documents 
resolving this case are in place." 
Apparently unclear as to whether the 
memorandum decision constituted a final 
judgment—a peculiar worry in view of die 
explicit language of the minute entry--Gurley 
filed a notice of appeal from the memorandum 
decision on December 21, 1992. On January 7, 
1993, the trial court entered judgment awarding 
plaintiff $2300 in damages and $15,000 in 
attorney fees. On January 27. the trial court 
amended the judgment to recite that Nielson was 
also entitled to his costs. Gurley filed a second 
notice of appeal, from the amended judgment, 
on February 26, 1993. Thus, the notice of appeal 
Gurley filed on February 26, 1993. was filed 
within thirty days from the date the court entered 
die amended judgment, but was not filed within 
thirty days from the date of the original 
judgment. Therefore, the first question presented 
by Nielson's motion to dismiss is whether the 
thirty-day period for Gurley to file his notice of 
appeal began running as of the date the court 
entered the original judgment or as of the date 
the court amended die judgment. 
In Utah, die rule of law governing diis issue 
is clear: 
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an 
amendment or modification not changing the 
substance or character of the judgment, such 
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which 
relates back to the time the original judgment 
was entered, and does not enlarge the time for 
appeal; but where the modification or 
amendment is in some material matter, the time 
begins to run from the time of the modification 
or amendment. 
Adamson, 185 P.2d at 268. Accord In re 
Marriage of Mullinax, 292 Or. 416, 639 P.2d 
628. 633-34 (1982). See also Federal Trade 
Comm'n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator 
Co . 344 U S. 206, 211-12, 73 S.Ct. 245, 248-49, 
97 L.Ed. 245 (1952) (fact that Court amends 
judgment in immaterial way does not extend 
time within which appellant can seek review): 
C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation. Amendment of 
Judgment as Affecting Time for Taking or 
Prosecuting Appellate Review Proceedings. 21 
A.L.R.2d 285, 287. 295-304 (1952) 
(summarizing cases addressing calculation of 
time for appeal based on whether amendment to 
judgment was material or simply clerical). 
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In the instant case, the modification or 
amendment was purely clerical in nature. The 
trial court did not enlarge the award of attorney 
fees; instead, the court merely clarified its order 
by indicating that Nielson was entitled to his 
taxable costs in addition to the $15,000 attorney 
fee award. This amendment was not of sufficient 
importance to change the character of die 
judgment. It did not affect any substantive rights 
running to the litigants. Indeed, the court's 
amendment to the judgment was completely 
unnecessary because costs are awarded as a 
matter of course to the prevailing party unless 
the court otherwise orders. Utah R.Civ.P. 
54(d)(1). The effect of the amendment did not 
create a new judgment for purposes of 
determining the timeliness of appeal, and the 
time in which Gurley could appeal commenced 
to rim from the date of the original judgment. 3 
We next consider whether Gurley timely 
filed notice of appeal from the trial court's 
original judgment. The trial court issued its 
memorandum decision on December 18. 1992 
On December 21, 1992. Gurley prematurely 
filed his first notice of appeal. The trial court 
entered judgment on January 7. 1993 Thus, 
Gurlev filed a notice of appeal after die trial 
r ' 
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court announced its decision, but prior to the 
court's entry of judgment. Rule 4(c) anticipates 
just such a scenario and states that 
[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (b) of this 
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order 
but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such 
entry and on die day thereof. 
Utah R.App.P. 4(c). Therefore, under Rule 
4(c), we consider Gurley's notice of appeal to 
have been filed as of January 7. 1993-die date 
the court entered its judgment-unless the case is 
governed by die exception set forth in Rule 4(b). 
Rule 4(b) states: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in die trial court by any party 
(1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under 
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings 
of fact, whether or not an alteration of die 
judgment would be required if the motion is 
granted: (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment: or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of die order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion.... A 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of die above motions shall have no effect. A 
new notice of appeal must be filed within die 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the 
order of die trial court disposing of the motion as 
provided above. 
Utah R.App.P. 4(b) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, by motion served on 
January 21, 1993, Gurley sought to set aside the 
judgment entered on January 7. 1993, and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law7 
contained therein. However, Gurley's motion did 
not trigger the exception to Rule 4(c) provided 
for in Rule 4(b). First, Ourley's motion was not 
timely, as he served it more than ten days after 
the court entered judgment. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
59(e). Second, Gurley wididrew his motion to 
set aside on February 26. 1993. and thus the 
court neither granted nor denied his motion and 
did not enter an order which, under Rule 4(b). 
would trigger a new thirty-day appeal time. 
For the foregoing reasons, we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Gurley contends that the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over this case because 
Nielson failed to comply with the notice 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -1*2 
(1993). Nielson counters Gurley's assertion with 
a three-prong argument. First, Nielson contends 
that his action against Gurley did not invoke the 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
because Nielson accused Gurley of wrongdoing 
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in his individual capacity, as opposed to suing 
him for actions taken within the scope of his 
State employment. (In the vernacular employed 
at oral argument. Nielson contends this is 
routine litigation between "ordinary guys.") 
Second. Nielson contends that whatever 
immunity Gurley otherwise would have has 
been waived. Finally, Nielson argues that even if 
the Govermnental Immunity Act applies to this 
action, he fully complied with the notice 
provisions necessary to maintain his action. 
A. Action Under Color of Authority 
Obviously, a plaintiff can sue a State 
employee acting in his or her individual capacity7 
without implicating the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. State employees, like other 
citizens, engage in a myriad of personal and off-
duty activities for which they, like other citizens, 
may be subject to suit. The Utah Govermnental 
Immunity Act recognizes this fact and only 
applies to an action against a state employee "for 
an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority." Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2). -12 (1993). " 
r 
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However, in the instant case, it is clear that 
the conduct of which Nielson complains was 
conduct that Gurley engaged in while 
performing his duties as a State employee and 
was done under the color of that authority. 
Nielson based his original complaint against 
Gurley on allegations that Gurley failed to 
comply with regulations pertaining to M[a]ny 
peace officer or special function officer." 
Moreover, in his answer to the complaint filed 
on October 2, 1990, Gurley raised governmental 
immunity m several affirmative defenses, 
invoking numerous statutory provisions of the 
Govermnental Immunity Act. including those 
provisions that require a plaintiff to provide 
proper notice. Therefore, Nielson was aware, 
even from the initial stages of this litigation. 4 
that Gurley claimed to have seized his property 
under color of the State's authority. Given this 
knowledge, Nielson will not now be heard to 
complain that the Governmental Immunity Act 
does not apply because Nielson only meant to 
sue Gurley as an ordinary' individual, not for 
any tiling he did in the course of his employment 
by the State. 
B. Notice a Precondition to Maintaining Action 
The failure to comply with the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act deprives the trial court of subject 
matter jurisdiction, and therefore compliance 
with the act is a precondition to maintaining an 
action "against the state, or against its employee 
for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment or under color of authority." Utah 
Code Ami. § 63-30-12 (1993). See id. § 63-30-
11; Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 
P.2d 535. 540-41 (Utah App.1992). In Lamarr, 
we held that a suit against the State cannot be 
maintained unless proper notice is given. 828 
P.2d at 542. Moreover, we pointed out that 
because improper notice divests the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction, failure to provide 
proper notice of claim is a non-waivable defense 
diat any party, or die court, can raise at any time. 
Id. at 540. 
Nielson, like the plaintiff in Lamarr, claims 
the notice issue is not properly before this court. 
However, in Lamarr we rejected the plaintiffs 
argument that a state subdivision had waived 
compliance with the notice 
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provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
We expressly stated: 
Lamarr asserts the notice issue is an affirmative 
defense that was not pleaded in the answer, and 
thus Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure precludes UDOT from raising it in its 
summary judgment motion and on appeal. 
Lamarr notes UDOT never mentions the term 
"notice of claim" in its answer. He further argues 
UDOT did not request the court to rule on this 
issue on summary judgment and therefore we 
cannot consider it on appeal. Lamarr's argument, 
however, misconstrues the nature of the 
statutory notice of claim requirement. Lamarr 
erroneously asserts the notice of claim provision 
is a statute of limitation. Rather, the supreme 
court has held the statutory notice requirement is 
a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition 
to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 
250 (Utah 1988). 
Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, this part of Nielson's waiver 
argument fails. 
Nielson further contends that under the 
substantive provisions of the Governmental 
Immunity Act the sovereign has waived 
Gurlev's immunity. Nielson points to two 
provisions in the Governmental Immunity Act 
that he claims divest Gurley of immunity from 
suit. Section 63-30-5 states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations shall not be subject to the 
requirements of [various provisions, including 
the notice requirement!. 
c 
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Utah Code Aim. § 63-30-5(1) (1993) 
(emphasis added). Nielson contends that his 
claims against Gurley arose out of two contracts 
with the State-his lease with the State and his 
permit to operate his dog-training activities. 
Therefore, Nielson argues that he did not need to 
provide notice of claim in order to maintain his 
action. 
However, Nielson ignores the operative 
language of the statute that he claims negates the 
requirement to provide notice. While the statutes 
that extend sovereign immunity include both 
entities and individual state employees, see Utah 
Code Aim. §§ 63-30-11(2), -12 (1993), section 
63-30-5 waives the notice requirements and 
substantive immunity for claims arising from 
"any contractual obligation" only as concerns 
"all governmental entities." Section 63-30-5 
does not waive the notice requirements for a suit 
against a state employee "for any act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority," Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2), -
12 (1993), notwithstanding a nexus between the 
claim asserted and "any contractual obligation." 
Thus, the waiver of immunity applicable to 
contract claims is not applicable to Nielson's 
action against Gurley. 
Finally, Nielson contends that the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply 
because Gurley acted with malice and thus the 
sovereign has waived Gurley's immunity. It is 
true that if the employee acted or failed to act 
through malice or fraud, the employee cannot 
successfully invoke governmental immunity as 
an affirmative defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-4(3 )(b) (1993). However, Nielson 
confuses the scope of the notice requirement 
with the extent of substantive sovereign 
immunity protection. Complying with the notice 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is 
a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition 
to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with the 
substantive provisions contained within the 
Governmental Immunity Act which insulate the 
sovereign and its operatives from liability. See 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250"(Utah 
1988); Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 540-41. If. as 
Nielson argues, a plaintiff need only provide 
notice in those situations when the sovereign 
may properly invoke immunity under the 
substantive provisions of the Act, the notice 
requirement would be meaningless 5 because the 
substantive provisions of sovereign immunity 
would fully protect the sovereign and its 
operatives in any event. 
We conclude that Gurley's immunity was 
not waived and that Nielson had to comply with 
the notice provisions of the Governmental 
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Immunity Act in order to maintain his action 
against Gurley. 
C. Failure to Comply with Notice Provisions 
In order to comply with die Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a written notice of claim with the entity 
before maintaining an action, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
(1993) provides that 
[a] claim against the state, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim arises, 
or before the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under Section 63-30-11. regardless of 
Iast~: '••: 
whether or not the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental. 
In the instant case, Nielson's claim arose on 
September 8, 1990, when he discovered Gurley 
had dismantled and seized his property. Nielson 
filed his first complaint against Gurley on 
September 18. 1990. However. Nielson did not 
file a notice of claim with the Attorney General 
or the Division of Wildlife Resources prior to 
initiating this legal action. On October 2, 1990. 
Gurley answered Nielson's complaint and, by 
referring to die statutory provisions concerning 
notice, raised plaintiffs failure to comply with 
those provisions as an affirmative defense. On 
June 24. 1991. the trial court entered partial 
summary judgment against Gurley on the issue 
of liability. Nielson filed a second action against 
Gurley based on the same conduct in September 
of 1991, almost one year after the cause of 
action arose. The two actions were consolidated 
on August 13, 1992. 
On September 3, 1991. within the one-year 
period prescribed by statute. Nielson apparently 
endeavored to comply with die notice 
requirement by sending a copy of his complaint 
and notice of claim to the Division of Wildlife 
Resources. However, to comply with the notice 
requirement, Nielson was also required to send 
notice of claim to the Attorney General within 
the one-year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-12 (1993); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 541. It was 
not until December 4, 1991, that Nielson sent 
notice of claim to die Attorney General. 6 The 
notice was deficient, however, in diat it came 
more than one year after the claim arose, and 
such deficiency was fatal to die trial court's 
jurisdiction. See. e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716 
P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1985) (per curiam): Sears v. 
Soudiworth, 563 P.2d 192,194 (Utah 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
We have jurisdiction of Gurley's appeal. 
We conclude diat Nielson's failure to provide 
timely notice of claim as required by Utah Code 
Ann §§ 63-30-11. -12 (1993) deprived the trial 
court of subject matter jurisdiction over 
Nielson's claims against Gurley. Accordingly, 
^e vacate the trial court's judgment. 
DAVIS and GREENWOOD. JI , concur. 
1 Nielson did not pursue the defamation claim at 
trial. 
2 Because we hold that the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute, we 
do not reach the other issues Gurley raises on 
appeal. 
3 Even if we are incorrect, and the appeal time 
runs from entry of the amended judgment, we 
would still have jurisdiction over this appeal 
because Gurley filed a notice of appeal within 
thirty days from entry of the amended judgment. 
4 Such awareness became increasingly-
unavoidable as the action progressed. On April 
22, 1991, Gurley filed an affidavit expressly 
stating that he dismantled the bird pen pursuant 
to his authority as a law enforcement officer. 
Moreover. Gurley attached a citation to his 
affidavit alleging Nielson violated laws and 
regulations pertaining to die taking, possession, 
and releasing of wild game birds. Although 
Gurley's affidavit was stricken from the record 
as being "riddled with untruths," it did serve to 
put Nielson on actual notice that Gurley claimed 
to have acted as a state employee. Indeed, when 
Nielson filed yet a tliird action, one alleging civil 
rights violations that was later removed to 
federal court, he expressly recognized that "[t]he 
conduct of... Gurley was performed under color 
of various statutes, ordinances, regulations, 
customs or usages of the State of Utah." 
Therefore, Nielson's claim that he sued Gurley 
in his individual capacity, as an ordinary citizen, 
and was unaware that Gurley acted as a wildlife 
enforcement officer, is untenable. 
5 We have recently discussed the several 
purposes the notice requirement is intended to 
serve. See Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666. 671 
(Utah App. 1994). 
c last, -i: 
6 Nielson contends that he complied with the 
notice requirements by serving notice of claim 
on both the Attorney General and the DWR 
within the one-year period. However, die record 
does not support Nielson's claim. In order to 
have complied with the notice requirements, 
Nielson must have filed two notices of claim-
one with the agency concerned and the second 
with the Attorney General~by September 8, 
1991. See generally Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 
666 (Utah App. 1994). While the record does 
indicate that Nielson timely served notice of 
claim on Gurley and DWR, the record is devoid 
of proof of service of any timely pre-suit notice 
on the Attorney General. Nielson claims he sent 
a copy of the proposed complaint to the 
Attorney General on August 14, 1991. However, 
Nielson can point to nothing in the record to 
support this claim and readily admits that the 
December 4, 1991, notice he sent to the 
Attorney General was done because he 
"anticipated] that the ... first and second notices 
were defective." 
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RUSSON, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Edward Flower and Lauretta 
Pelton appeal the trial court's denial of their 
post-trial motion for attorney fees that they filed 
five days after the jury returned a verdict in their 
favor but before entry of final judgment. We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of 
this appeal. Meadowbrook, LLC 
("Meadowbrook"), which owns Meadowbrook 
Mobile Home Park, brought an action to evict 
defendants, alleging that they had failed to 
comply with certain mobile home park rules and 
that their lease should therefore be terminated. 
At trial the jury found that defendants had 
complied with the mobile home park rules and 
rendered a verdict in their favor. 
Under section 12 of defendants' lease and 
under the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act, 1 the prevailing party in an eviction suit 
such as the one brought by Meadowbrook is 
entitled to attorney fees. Although defendants in 
their answer pled for an award of costs and 
attorney fees for defending the lawsuit, they 
failed to raise their claim to, or offer evidence 
C 
of those fees during the trial. Instead, five days 
after trial but before entry of final judgment, 
defendants moved for attorney fees. 2 The trial 
court denied the motion, concluding diat (1) 
defense counsel's failure to present evidence at 
trial as to attorney fees and counsel's failure to 
move the court to allow such evidence to be 
presented after trial resulted in a waiver of any 
claim to tiiose fees, and (2) defense counsel 
could not move the court for attorney fees after 
trial unless the issue had been specifically 
reserved during trial. 
On appeal, defendants argue that a request 
for attorney fees may be made for the first time 
by post-trial motion. Although Meadowbrook 
does not deny that defendants were entitled to 
attorney fees under the lease and under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
Meadowbrook argues that a claim for attorney 
fees must be supported by evidence that is 
introduced at trial and that failure to present 
evidence of such fees during trial constitutes a 
waiver of all rights to claim those fees any time 
in the future. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's conclusion that a request for 
attorney fees is waived if not made at trial is a 
legal conclusion. We review a trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, granting no 
deference to die trial judge's legal 
determinations. See State v. 
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Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994): Society of 
Separationists. Inc. v. Taggart. 862 P.2d 1339. 
1341 (Utah 1993). 
ANALYSIS 
The issue in this case is whether a 
prevailing party waives its right to attorney fees 
if it fails to present evidence of attorney fees or 
move the court during trial to allow evidence of 
such fees to be presented after trial. 
The general rule in Utah is that subject to 
certain exceptions, a part)- is entitled to attorney 
fees only if authorized by statute or by contract. 
See Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 885 
P.2d 759. 782 (Utah 1994): Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985. 988 (Utah 1988). 
However, the exact deadline as to when a party 
must raise a claim to attorney fees or be deemed 
to have waived any claim to such fees is subject 
to debate. Both defendants and Meadowbrook 
rely upon Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1985). In Cabrera, this court held that a 
party who failed to request all attorney fees 
incurred for trial work during the "trial phase" of 
a case could not request such fees for the first 
time after the case had been remanded to the 
trial court for the sole purpose of determining 
attorney fees incurred in defending the case on 
appeal. Id. at 624. We reasoned: 
[AJ part}' who is entitled to attorneys fees and 
costs and fails to ask for all of them in the trial 
phase of the case, or fails to adduce adequate 
evidence in support of a finding of reasonable 
attorneys fees, waives any right to claim those 
fees later.... It is not consistent with judicial 
economy to allow a party to apply for additional 
fees for trial work, whether in an independent 
hearing, in a separate suit, or at a hearing to 
determine an award of attorneys fees for 
necessary appellate work. Once the matter is 
litigated, or could have been litigated, a party 
may not later come into court to seek an 
additional award. Therefore, an attorney will 
have to estimate fees for work done on post-trial 
motions or ask the trial court to schedule a 
hearing on attorneys fees either after post-trial 
r 
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motions are disposed of or after the time for 
filing such motions has expired. 
Id. at 624 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 3 
Defendants argue that the "trial phase" of a 
case includes timely post-trial motions, while 
Meadowbrook argues that the "trial phase" ends 
with the rendering of the \erdict and the 
dismissal of the jury. We did not clearly 
establish in Cabrera or in any other case when 
the "trial phase" ends. While that term may have 
different meanings in different contexts, the time 
is ripe for a clear rule with respect to the issue 
presented in this case. Thus, for reasons set forth 
below, and in the narrow context of determining 
when a prevailing party waives its right to 
attorney fees, the "trial phase" ends, not with the 
rendering of the jury's verdict, but with the 
signed entry of final judgment or order, at which 
time trial issues become ripe for appeal and a 
party may file a timely notice of appeal pursuant 
to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4 
Several policy reasons support such a rule. 
First, in most instances, requiring all parties to 
present evidence of attorney fees to a jury before 
resting (heir cases would contravene judicial 
economy. Where a contract or statute provides 
for attorney fees to the prevailing party, a party 
does not even become entitled to such fees until 
the jury has determined which party has 
prevailed in the case. Thus, a would-be losing 
party who submits evidence of its attorney fees 
to the jury increases costs to all parties and 
wastes judicial time and resources. This is 
especially apparent in complex litigation 
involving multiple parties. 
Second, the determination of reasonable 
attorney fees is an issue generally left to die 
sound discretion of the trial court, not the jury. 
See Salmon v. Davis Comity. 916 P.2d 890. 897 
(Utah 1996) (Russon. J., dissenting): Dixie State 
Bank. 764 P.2d at 988; see also 
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47 Am.Jur.2d Jury § 59 (1995); 20 C.J.S. Costs 
§ 125 (1990). Because the issue of attorney fees 
is generally ancillary to die underlying action, a 
trial court's decision regarding the award of such 
fees normally requires an inquiry separate from 
the main cause of action to be proved at trial— 
"an inquiry that cannot even commence until 
one party has 'prevailed.1 " White v. New 
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec, 455 U.S. 
445, 452, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 
(1982): see also McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 
1 F.3d 1306. 1314 (2d Cir.1993); Garcia v. 
Burlington Northern R.R., 818 F.2d 713, 721 
(10th Cir.1987). The trial court's decision in this 
regard is wholly independent of the jury: 
therefore, the prevailing party should be entitled 
to move the court for attorney fees after the jury 
has rendered its verdict and been discharged. 
Third, there must come a time of closure, or 
finality, in a case when a claim for attorney fees 
must be raised or waived. That time is the signed 
entry of final judgment. See Fair Housing 
Advocates Ass'n v. James, 114 Ohio App.3d 
104, 682 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (1996) (holding 
that party must either present evidence of 
attorney fees at trial or move for award of fees 
before court issues final judgment). Defendants 
urge this court to adopt the "universal rule" in 
other jurisdictions, which permits a timely post-
trial motion for attorney fees. Some of the 
jurisdictions defendants cite allow motions for 
such fees to be filed after entry of final 
judgment, while others allow motions to be filed 
after the time for filing an appeal has expired. 5 
However, neither approach fosters the most 
sensible and expeditious appeals process. 
To illustrate, a party who appeals the 
judgment on the underlying merits may also 
wish to appeal the attorney fee award. In 
jurisdictions that allow a motion for such fees to 
be brought after the time for filing an appeal on 
the original judgment has expired, the appellant 
would have to file a second appeal based upon 
the attorney fee award. Judicial-economy during 
the appeals process would not be furthered in 
any way by requiring such piecemeal appeals. 
Moreover, a party's decision to appeal on the 
underlying merits may largely depend upon the 
r 
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size of the attorney fee award. See T & G 
Aviation, Inc. v. Footh, 792 P.2d 671, 672 
(Alaska 1990) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that allowing party to file motion for 
attorney fees seventy days after entry of 
judgment is unreasonable and that motion 
should generally be brought within ten days after 
entry of judgment because losing party may base 
its decision on whether to appeal on size of 
adverse award of attorney fees). 6 
Similarly, in those jurisdictions which 
permit a motion for attorney fees to be brought 
within thirty days after entry of judgment (the 
time during which an appeal may be filed in 
many jurisdictions), the moving party could 
delay filing the motion until die time for filing 
an appeal has nearly expired. Thus, the appellant 
may have to move die court for an extension of 
time to appeal in order to adequately address the 
issue of the attorney fee award in the original 
appeal. 7 Or, as already mentioned, if die trial 
court 
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cannot award attorney fees until after the time 
for filing die original appeal has expired, the 
appellant would have to file a second appeal if it 
decides to challenge the award. Absent a rule or 
statutory provision to die contrary, the rule we 
adopt today prevents a party from bringing a 
post-judgment motion for attorney fees and will 
generally enable an appellant to appeal all 
issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a 
single notice of appeal. 8 
Meadowbrook argues that Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). does not 
permit a party to make a post-trial motion for 
attorney fees. In Girard, die plaintiff-lessor 
brought an action to declare forfeiture of a lease 
on the ground that die defendants had failed to 
obtain liability insurance coverage as required 
by the terms of the lease agreement. While the 
plaintiffs complaint contained a demand for an 
award of attorney fees incurred in enforcing the 
lease agreement, the plaintiff rested her case 
without presenting evidence in support of her 
claim for such fees. The trial court, however, 
reopened the case sua sponte to allow the 
plaintiff to submit evidence with respect to 
attorney fees which the plaintiff omitted at the 
time of trial. This court vacated and set aside the 
award of attorney fees, holding that a trial court 
has no discretion to reopen a case sua sponte. 
We reasoned: 
Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial 
system of conducting trials precludes the court 
from infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy. 
Counsel is entitled to control the presentation of 
evidence, and should there be a failure to present 
evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally 
viewed as a waiver of the claim. 
Id. at 247. We further stated, "[T]he 
interests of justice are not enhanced when the 
court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out 
and deciding an issue that would otherwise be 
dead, it not having been litigated at the time of 
trial." Id. 
We recognize that our language in Girard 
with respect to attorney fees was overly broad. 
Thus, for die reasons set forth above, we 
disavow any implication in Girard that a 
prevailing party must litigate the issue of 
attorney fees before resting its case or waive any 
claim to such fees where they are to be 
determined by the trial court. 9 Indeed, attorney 
fees are routinely established by proffer or 
affidavit, 10 and by evidentiary hearing when 
necessary. 
We emphasize, however, that a prevailing 
party must be prepared to address the issue of 
attorney fees at the court's convenience. If the 
court directs the parties to address the issue 
before the close of evidence, before the 
rendering of the jury verdict, or at any other time 
the court deems appropriate, the prevailing party 
must comply. Therefore, our holding in this case 
is narrowly tailored: a prevailing party that files 




entry of final judgment or order does not waive 
its claim to such fees, unless otherwise provided 
by statute or unless it fails to comply with the 
court's order to address the issue at a specific 
time. 
We further emphasize that prudent trial 
counsel should always preserve the issue of 
attorney fees, as well as any other issues not 
disposed of during trial, before resting their 
cases, thereby allowing the court to address the 
issue at the court's and the parties' convenience. 
Trial counsel who fail to preserve an issue, 
opting instead to raise the issue for the first time 
in a post-trial motion, simply gamble that their 
motion will be filed before entry of final 
judgment. In the case before us. defendants 
moved for attorney fees prior to the signed entry 
of final judgment; therefore, their motion was 
timely, even though it was filed five days after 
the jury rendered its verdict. While the trial court 
did not enter final judgment until nearly four 
months after the jury verdict had it done so 
before counsel filed the motion for attorney fees, 
defendants would have waived their claim to 
those fees. 
Because we hold in defendants' favor, 
defendants are also entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in this appeal. See R & R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc.. 936 P.2d 
1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (where party entitled to 
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, award of 
attorney fees on appeal is proper); Management 
Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 
406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that contract 
provision allowing for attorney fees includes 
those fees incurred on appeal as well as at trial). 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Because defendants moved for attorney 
fees before signed entry of final judgment, diey 
did not waive their claim to such fees. We 
therefore reverse the trial court's denial of 
defendants' motion and remand the case for the 
puqx>se of determining the reasonable attorney 
fees to which defendants are entitled. 
HOWE, C.J., and DURHAM. Associate 
C I . and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN. JI . 
concur in Justice RUSSON'S opinion. 
1 See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8. 
2 Final judgment was not entered until nearly 
four months after the jury returned its verdict. 
3 On remand, the trial court in Cabrera awarded 
attorney fees for work related to post-trial 
motions, preparation of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and an order and judgment, 
in addition to fees incurred defending the case 
on appeal. 694 P.2d at 624. 
4 See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A; Utah R. App. P. 4. 
5 See, e.g.. T & G Aviation, Inc. v. Footh, 792 
P.2d 671. 672 (Alaska 1990) (upholding award 
of attorney fees where motion for such fees filed 
for first time seventy days after entry of 
judgment); Sperry v. Bolas, 786 P.2d 517, 518 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1989) ("Since a request for 
attorney fees may be considered after the entry 
of judgment we conclude the trial court erred in 
denying plaintiffs request on the ground that 
judgment had been entered and that, therefore, 
the request was made too late."); Cheek v. 
McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So.2d 977, 979 
(Fla.1987) ("Therefore, we hold that proof of 
attorney's fees whether such fees are provided 
for by statute, or by contract may be presented 
for the first time after final judgment pursuant to 
a motion for attorney's fees." (citation omitted)); 
Touchdown Sportswear, Inc. v. Hickory Point 
Mall Co., 165 Ill.App.3d 72, 116 Ill.Dec. 25. 
518 N.E.2d 647, 648 (1987) ("[W]here fees were 
pleaded and are an entitlement to the prevailing 
party, the failure to reserve the issue should not 
bar a petition for attorney fees filed within 30 
days of judgment."); Fanners his. Exch. v. 
Pickering.* 104 Nev. 660. 765 P.2d 181. 182 
(1988) ("Absent a specific statutory provision 
governing the time frame in which a party must 
request attorney's fees, the timeliness of such 
requests, we conclude, is a matter left to the 
discretion of the trial court."). 
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6 The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure were 
amended in 1997 and now provide that a motion 
must be filed within ten days after the date 
shown on the judgment. Alaska R. Civ. P. 
82(b)(4)(c). 
7 See Utah R. App. P. 4(e). 
8 Some statutes provide that attorney fees shall 
be taxed as costs. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. § 
14-2-1(5) (attorney fees in action upon bond in 
private contract); § 14-2-2(3) (attorney fees in 
action for failure to obtain bond in private 
contract); § 34-27-1 (attorney fees in suits for 
wages); § 38-1-18 (attorney fees in suits 
enforcing mechanic's liens); § 63-56-38(5) 
(attorney fees in suit upon payment bond in 
construction contract); § 78-45f-313(2) (attorney 
fees in actions under uniform interstate family 
support act). Generally, under these statutes 
attorney fees may be included in a cost 
memorandum, which may be filed and served 
within five days after entry of final judgment, as 
prescribed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d). 
9 Parties may agree to submit the issue of 
attorney fees to a jury. See First Gen. Servs. v. 
Perkins, 918 P.2d 480. 483 (Utah Ct.App.1996). 
Moreover, in certain circumstances, attorney 
fees may be considered an item of consequential 
damages to be decided by a jury. See Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey,*781 P.2d 414, 419-20 
(Utah 1989). Our rule in this case does not apply 
where the issue of attorney fees is to be decided 
by the jury. In such circumstances, evidence of 
such fees must be presented to the jury 
according to established trial procedure. 
10 See Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rules 4-505 
& 4-505.1; see also IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon. 
776 P.2d 607. 617-18 (Utah 1989) (affirming 
trial court's award of attorney fees which court 
based on affidavit because attorney's initial 
proffer was insufficient); Walther v. Walther, 
709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985) (affirming 
attorney fee award based upon proffer not 
challenged by adverse party); Muir v. Muir, 841 
P.2d 736. 742 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (holding that 
trial court abused discretion in reducing attorney 
fee award where proffered evidence of fees was 
adequate and entirely undisputed). 
11 As a peripheral matter, we address an issue 
that relates to appellate procedure before this 
court. In support of their argument that under the 
"universal rule." requests for attorney fees made 
for the first time by post-trial motions are timely, 
defendants' brief contains a series of citations to 
other jurisdictions. One of those cases upon 
which defendants rely. Downs v. Stockman, 555 
So.2d 867 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989). was quashed 
by Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835 
(Fla.1991). The Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure require that "[ajll briefs [under rule 
24] be concise, presented with accuracy ... and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, mimateriai or 
scandalous matters." Utah R.App. P. 24(j). The 
process of "Shepardizing" a case is fundamental 
to legal research and can be completed in a 
maimer of minutes, especially when done with 
the aid of a computer. Though we do not 
consider counsel's actions to be egregious in this 
case, we admonish all attorneys to ensure the 
validity of all cases presented before this court. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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HOWE, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Plaintiff ProMax Development Corporation 
appeals from a judgment dismissing its 
complaint against defendants Rick and Martha 
Raile for mechanic's lien foreclosure, breach of 
contract. and unjust enrichment. 
BACKGROUND 
2 We state the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Railes, who were the prevailing 
party below. During the spring of 1994. Rick 
and Martha Raile, a married couple, verbally 
agreed to hire ProMax Development 
Corporation to build a home for them for 
$300,000 excluding the lot and landscaping. The 
agreement was made between the Railes and 
their longtime friend. Phil Bates, one of 
ProMax's principals. 
C last, so 
3 After entering into the agreement, the Railes 
purchased a building lot with money obtained 
from the sale of their previous home. They also 
obtained a $300,000 construction loan, hi about 
May of 1994, ProMax began constructing the 
home. Its goal was to have the home completed 
by October I, 1994, so that it could be exhibited 
in the Parade of Homes, a sale promotion 
sponsored by home builders. When the Railes 
expressed concern over the cost of the home. 
Bates assured them that ProMax could build the 
home within the $300,000 budget because it was 
going to be in the Parade of Homes and 
suppliers would therefore provide ProMax with 
discounts of up to forty percent. 
4 In about August of 1994, Bates told the Railes 
that ProMax would need additional money to 
complete the home. They applied for additional 
financing and were approved for a takeout loan 
of $330,000. The home was completed by 
October 1 and was exliibited in the Parade of 
Homes. A closing on die permanent home loan 
was scheduled for October 12, but prior to 
closing, Bates again told the Railes that ProMax 
needed more money to cover construction costs. 
The Railes then agreed to pay an additional 
$33,505.32 to ProMax as full and final payment 
for the home construction. On ProMax's behalf. 
Bates then signed documents confirming that 
ProMax would accept the payment from the 
Railes as a final payment. He also signed a 
statement for a title company acknowledging die' 
total payoff amount, a lien guaranty certifying 
diere were no outstanding amounts owed for the 
home construction, and a lien waiver 
relinquishing all lien rights to the home. 
5 At the closing, all necessary papers were 
signed, and ProMax received a check for 
$33,505.32 as payment in full for constructing 
the home. Following the closing, however, Bates 
approached the Railes and asked them to sign a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") 
representing diat ProMax needed to provide it to 
the bank. Rick Railes signed die document, even 
diough the purchase price and financing 
amounts were left blank, and per Bates' request. 
Rick back-dated the REPC to April 20. 1994. 
Bates then presented Martha Railes with the 
REPC for her signature, but when she expressed 
concern because the document did not list the 
purchase price and financing amounts. Bates 
told her that he would fill in the amounts later by 
putting in the numbers the bank needed to see. 
6 At some point after the Railes signed the 
REPC, Bates filled in the blank lines for the 
purchase and financing amounts. He listed the 
total purchase price of the home as $508,000. 
including a fictitious $30,000 earnest money 
deposit and $80,000 the Railes supposedly paid 
to ProMax for die building lot. 
7 Approximately one week after the closing. 
Bates lold the Railes that they owed ProMax an 
additional $5,000 for a lot reservation fee and 
landscaping. The Railes paid the money. Several 
weeks later. Bates told the Railes that they owed 
ProMax an additional amount exceeding 
$136,000 for constructing the home. This time 
the Railes refused to pay any additional monies, 
and ProMax responded by filing a mechanic's 
lien and this suit. Specifically, ProMax sought 
the mechanic's lien foreclosure, damages for 
breach of contract, and recovery for unjust 
enrichment. 
8 The parties agreed to a bench trial, and after 
the close of the evidence, the trial court found in 
favor of the Railes. It concluded diat the 
documents the Railes signed at the loan closing 
proved that an accord and satisfaction had 
occurred, and it dismissed ProMax's complaint 
with prejudice. The judgment, entered on 
October 1, 1997. provided in part that 
plaintiffs complaint be dismissed with prejudice 
and upon the merits, with costs being awarded to 
the defendants after an appropriate hearing on 
taxation of costs as provided by Section 38-1-18, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), said 
judgment to bear interest at the legal rate until 
paid. 
9 Subsequently, the Railes moved for the 
taxation of costs, and after a hearing, the trial 
court entered an order on December 1. 1997. 
awarding them $7,656 for the fees of one of 
C 
their attorneys, plus $1,336.10 in court costs, for 
a total of $8,992.10. The court denied any award 
of attorney fees for a second attorney who had 
represented die Railes, stating diat his affidavit 
lacked "die specificity necessary to sustain an 
award of attorney fees." Ten days later, the 
Railes moved to alter or amend the order to 
increase the award of fees to $28,291.50. 
apparently to cover the fees of the second 
attorney and a third attorney who had previously 
represented them. The court partially granted the 
motion by an order on February 9, 1998. 
rescinded its December 1 order, and increased 
die Railes' award of attorney fees to $20,791.50. 
No mention was made of die $1,336.10 in court 
costs. ProMax filed a notice of appeal on 
February 13, 1998. assailing die judgment 
insofar as it holds diat die Railes proved an 
accord and satisfaction. Promax has not raised 
the issue of the award of attorney fees to die 
Railes. The Railes cross-appeal, assigning as 
error die failure of die trial court to award them 
the $1,336.10 in court costs and $7,500 in 
attorney fees paid to the third attorney. 
ANALYSIS 
I. JURISDICTION 
10 The Railes move to dismiss ProMax's appeal 
as being filed untimely. They argue diat die trial 
court entered final judgment on October 1, 1997, 
but ProMax did not file its notice of appeal until 
February 13. 1998. long past the thirty days 
prescribed for filing by Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a). The Railes assert: (1) die 
October 1 judgment was a final judgment as 
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 
and is appealable because it disposed of the 
merits of die action; (2) their post-trial motions— 
to have die amount of attorney fees determined 
and costs taxed-dealt with a different matter, 
collateral to the merits of die action: and (3) the 
orders of the court on December 1, 1997. and 
February 9, 1998. did not change or alter the 
October 1. 1997. judgment in any respect and 
therefore did not prevent that judgment from 
being final on the date of its entry, diereby 
starting the appeal time to run. They rely on 
Nielson \ . Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), where the court of appeals held that the 
amendment of a judgment to award the 
prevailing party court costs did not interrupt the 
running of the thirty-day appeal time. 
11 We deny the motion to dismiss ProMax's 
appeal. In Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 
185 P.2d 264 (1947), we stated: 
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an 
amendment or modification not changing the 
substance or character of the judgment, such 
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which 
relates back to the time the original judgment 
was entered, and does not enlarge the time for 
appeal; but where the modification or 
amendment is in some material matter, the time 
begins to rim from the time of the modification 
or amendment. 
112 Utah at 60, 185 P.2d at 268 (emphasis 
added). The two orders made on attorney fees 
subsequent to the October 1 judgment were 
modifications or amendments hi a "material 
matter." The first order awarded the Railes 
$7,656 in attorney fees, and the second order 
increased that amount to $20,791.50. These 
amendments were materially different from the 
amendment made in Neilson v. Gurley, where 
the modification or amendment was to recite that 
the prevailing party was entitled to court costs. 
As die court of appeals pointed out in that case, 
the amendment did not "affect any substantive 
rights running to the litigants. Indeed, the court's 
amendment to the judgment was completely 
unnecessary because costs are awarded as a 
matter of course to the prevailing party unless 
the court otherwise orders." 888 P.2d at 133 
(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)). 
12 Utah Code Aim. 38-1-18. which governs the 
award of attorney fees in this case, provides that 
in any action to enforce a mechanic's lien, "the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee. to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action." Where attorney fees are awarded to a 
party, whether denominated as an item of 
"costs" or not, and the amount is not stated in die 
judgment rendered on the merits of the case, and 
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evidence must be taken afterwards by the trial 
court either by affidavit or live testimony, there 
is no final judgment for the purposes of appeal 
until the amount of the fees has been ascertained 
and granted. However, when, as in Neilson, no 
attorney fees are involved but only court costs, 
which are usually small statutory amounts or 
liquidated amounts, such costs can be added 
later to a judgment without affecting its finality. 
13 We are aware that in Taylor v. Hansen. 958 
P.2d 923, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). the court of 
appeals adopted the rule enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Budinich v. 
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S. 
Ct. 1717, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1998). The Court 
held that a decision on the merits is a final 
decision for purposes of appeal, whether or not 
diere remains for adjudication a request for 
attorney fees or a determination of the amount of 
the fees. We decline to follow that rule. Instead, 
we follow the principle set out in Meadowbrook, 
LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1998). 
14 As pointed out in Meadowbrook, a party's 
decision to appeal on the underlying merits may 
often depend upon die size of die attorney fees 
awarded. See id. We there addressed the 
appropriate timing for parties' requests for 
attorney fees. While not strictly apposite to the 
instant case, our reasoning tiiere is useful. 
Explaining our holding, we presented the 
following model: 
[A] party who appeals die judgment on the 
underlying merits may also wish to appeal die 
attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a 
motion for such fees to be brought after die time 
for filing an appeal on the original judgment has 
expired, the appellant would have to file a 
second appeal based upon the attorney fee 
award. Judicial economy during the appeals 
process would not be furthered in any way by 
requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a 
party's decision to appeal on the underlying 
merits may largely depend upon the size of die 
attorney fee award. 
Id. Applied to the instant case, this reasoning is 
sound. It will save the resources of the parties 
and this court if the issue of attorney fees can be 
determined in the same appeal in which the 
merits of the underlying judgment are examined. 
Otherwise, a second appeal must be taken to 
challenge the amount of attorney fees awarded 
subsequent to the judgment on the merits and 
then examined in the light of the judgment on 
the merits. This would be wasteful. 
15 We therefore hold that, in the interest of 
judicial economy, a trial court must determine 
the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party 
before the judgment becomes final for the 
purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will serve 
both litigants and this court well, by "enabling] 
an appellant to appeal all issues, including an 
award of attorney fees, in a single notice of 
appeal" Meadowbrook. 959 P.2d at 119. 
16 The rule which we adopt is consistent with a 
prior order entered by this court in this case, 
ProMax originally filed a notice of appeal on 
December 12, 1997, but later voluntarily moved 
to dismiss that appeal after die Railes moved the 
trial court on December 11 to alter or amend its 
December 1 order awarding attorney fees. 
ProMax apparently recognized that there had not 
yet been a final determination as to the amount 
of attorney fees to which the Railes were 
entitled. In that order, this court stated: 
Plaintiffs motion to withdraw notice of appeal 
without prejudice is hereby granted. This court 
has no jurisdiction over the appeal, inasmuch as 
defendants have a motion pending before the 
trial court which renders the judgment entered 
by the trial court non-final. A new appeal must 
be filed within thirty days after the trial court 
enters a formal order on defendant's motion. See 
Swenson Assocs. Architects v. State. 889 P.2d 
415 (Utah 1994). 
II. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
17 ProMax contends that the trial court erred in 
holding that the lien waiver, final payoff 
disclosure, and other mortgage documents 
generated at closing amounted to an accord and 
satisfaction between ProMax and the Railes. We 
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review the trial court's ruling for correctness 
18 When the Railes orally contracted with 
ProMax to construct a home for them, the 
agreed-upon cost, according to the Railes, was 
$300,000. Several months later. ProMax 
demanded more money to complete the 
construction. The Railes' applied for an 
additional loan to cover ProMax's increased 
building costs. After die home was completed. 
ProMax again asked the Railes for more money 
to cover construction costs. To expedite closing 
and move-in dates, the Railes agreed to make 
one final payment to ProMax in the amount of 
$33,505. 
19 At closing. ProMax signed various 
documents confirming diat die $33,505 
represented the Railes' final payment to ProMax. 
These documents included a loan payoff 
statement for First American Title Co. and a lien 
guaranty certifying that there were "no unpaid 
bills for materials or labor furnished for the 
construction and erection, repairs or 
improvements" to the Railes1 home. ProMax also 
signed a lien waiver which stated tiiat upon 
negotiating die Railes' check for $33,505, 
ProMax "waives, releases and relinquishes all 
right of lien or claims payee now has to date 
upon the property described below," and 
"warrants and guarantees diat payment in full 
has been made by payee to all laborers and 
suppliers of labor and all materials to said 
premises incurred to date." 
20 ProMax contends that these documents do 
not meet the requirements for an accord and 
satisfaction. "An accord and satisfaction arises 
when the parties to a contract agree diat a 
different performance, to be made in substitution 
of the performance originally agreed upon, will 
discharge the obligation created under the 
original agreement." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. 
Mamas. 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). A party seeking to prove an 
accord and satisfaction must show (1) an 
unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over 
die amount due: (2) a payment offered as full 
settlement of die entire dispute; and (3) an 
acceptance of die payment as full settlement of 
the dispute. See Marton Remodeling v. Jensen. 
706 P.2d 607. 609-10 (Utah 1985). 
21 In this case, we find that there was evidence 
from which the trial court could find that the 
requirements of an accord and satisfaction 
between ProMax and die Railes were met. There 
is no question that there was a dispute between 
the two parties as to tlie amount of money the 
Railes owed ProMax for constructing tlie home. 
According to the Railes, ProMax was to 
construct the home for a total cost of $300,000. 
ProMax contended that the actual price agreed 
upon was the construction cost plus an 
additional $50,000 builder's fee. Tlie dollar 
amount ProMax was charging the Railes for tlie 
home construction changed several times during 
tlie construction period. Documents presented at 
trial show that ProMax claimed the Railes owed 
amounts which ranged from $300,000 to 
$382,000. Significantly, die amount that the 
Railes owed ProMax wras a disputed issue 
almost from the beginning of tlie construction 
relationship. 
22 Second, we find that the evidence supports 
the trial court's finding that a final payment 
amount was offered, accepted, and agreed upon 
by the parties as a full resolution and satisfaction 
of the disputed amount owed. With the total 
amount due in dispute, die parties offered and 
agreed to one final payment by the Railes in the 
amount of $33,505. This is evidenced by the 
testimony in tlie record and by several 
documents presented at trial showing that tlie 
Railes' payment to ProMax of $33,505 was a 
total payoff and satisfaction of the disputed 
amount of money owed for tlie home 
construction. It is of no consequence that there is 
no one written document signed by both ProMax 
and die Railes evidencing an accord and 
satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction need not 
be in writing. See Golden Key Realty. 699 P.2d 
at 732. The documents which were signed at 
closing by tlie parties, when considered together 
with die testimony they presented, provide 
evidence that supports tlie conclusion that an 
accord and satisfaction took place 
23 ProMax contends that the evidence presented 
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was insufficient to support the trial court's 
conclusion that an accord and satisfaction had 
occurred. However, when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Railes. 
there is evidence to support the trial court's 
ruling in favor of the Railes. Simply because 
ProMax presented evidence that diere was no 
accord and satisfaction between tlie parties, 
claiming instead that diere was a "side 
agreement" for more money, does not mean that 
the Railes' evidence of an accord and 
satisfaction is insufficient to support the trial 
court's ruling. 
24 ProMax points out that after the Railes closed 
on their home loan, the Railes entered into the 
REPC with ProMax which listed die price of the 
home at $508,000. ProMax asserts that this 
writing was the last of many documents 
executed by die Railes, and that it supersedes all 
prior documents, proving that die cost of the 
home exceeded what the Railes had paid. 
ProMax contends that even if there was an 
accord and satisfaction at closing between die 
parties, the REPC signed later constitutes a 
waiver of that accord and satisfaction. We 
disagree. 
25 On the day of closing, a loan officer for 
Chase Manhattan Bank told ProMax diat it 
needed a written document reflecting the terms 
of its agreement with the Railes. Thereafter, 
ProMax asked die Railes to sign die REPC and 
back-date it. Rick Raile signed the REPC even 
though the contract was left blank as to purchase 
price and financing amounts, and back-dated it 
April 20, 1994. When ProMax asked Martha 
Raile to sign die REPC. she expressed concern 
about signing the document because the 
purchase price and financing amounts had not 
yet been written on die REPC. Despite her 
concerns, Mardia Raile signed die REPC after 
Bates told her, "Don't worry. Mardia, I'm going 
to fill it in after, just to put the amounts to what 
the bank needs to see." At some point after the 
Railes had signed the REPC, ProMax completed 
the contract, showing die purchase price of 
$508,000, less amounts already paid. 
26 The background of the REPC calls its 
credibility into question. There was evidence 
that it was neither a contract between the parties 
nor proof that an accord and satisfaction had not 
occurred. The Railes executed the REPC after 
the closing on their home, and they were led to 
believe that ProMax would "just put in the 
amounts the bank needs to see." However, 
ProMax wrote incorrect figures on the REPC 
and then attempted to use it to support its claim 
that the Railes owed more money. We agree 
with the trial court that the REPC has no legal 
bearing relative to an accord and satisfaction 
between the parties. 
III. TRIAL BY MOTION 
27 Following an initial two-day trial, the trial 
court and the parties participated in a telephone 
conference during which die parties stipulated 
that "[d]ue to the busy nature of the Court's 
docket, the issue of accord and satisfaction will 
be addressed by die parties through wTitten 
briefs." The court went on to state that the briefs 
should be "styled as defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment," and it enumerated filing 
deadlines for motions and reply memoranda. 
28 Per the stipulation, the parties filed their 
respective motions and memoranda with the 
court. ProMax now contends that the trial court 
erred by ruling against it because there were 
material issues of fact in dispute at the time of 
the court's ruling. We find no error. The 
stipulation to wiiich ProMax voluntarily agreed 
does not state that the trial court would treat the 
motions as motions for summary judgment: 
rather, it stated that the case would be submitted 
through written briefs styled as motions for 
summary judgment. In this, die trial court was 
apparently referring to the briefing schedule and 
procedure, which includes an initial motion and 
memorandum, a motion and memorandum in 
opposition, and a reply memorandum. Other 
than following the briefing procedure of a 
typical motion for summary judgment, there is 
nothing to indicate that the trial court considered 
the stipulation as a motion for summary 
judgment. The initial brief the Railes submitted 
was styled as "Defendant's Supplemental Trial 
Brief." not as a motion for summary judgment. 
C 
last:.-" • 
This procedure was simply a continuation of the 
trial. On disputed facts, the trial court ruled 
against ProMax. 
IV. VIABILITY OF ADDITIONAL CLAIMS 
29 Finally, ProMax contends that if we conclude 
that the trial court did not err in ruling that an 
accord and satisfaction occurred, its claims 
against the Railes for breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment were still viable and should 
not have been dismissed. ProMax relies on an 
appraisal of the Railes' home that was for an 
amount hi excess of what they paid ProMax. We 
find no merit to diis argument. The market value 
of the home is of no consequence. The relevant 
factor is the existence of an accord and 
satisfaction. The trial court's determination, 
which we have affirmed, that the parties settled 
dieir dispute with an accord and satisfaction 
subsumes ProMax's claims for breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment. 
V. COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
30 On their cross-appeal, die Railes contend that 
the trial court erred by not granting them their 
court costs. The Railes submitted a 
memorandum claiming $1,336.10 in court costs. 
Promax made no objection. The December 1 
order awarded diose costs to die Railes, along 
with $7,656 in attorney fees. In the February 9 
order, which rescinded die December 1 order, 
the attorney fees were increased to $20,791.50. 
and the court costs previously awarded were not 
mentioned. It appears that diis was done 
inadvertently. Therefore, we remand diis case to 
the trial court to review its order of February 9. 
1998, to determine whether the Railes should 
ha\e been awarded costs in the amount of 
$1,336.10. 
31 The Railes next contend thai die trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to award them 
$7,500 in attorney fees for the services of a diird 
attorney. The court reasoned that the attorney's 
affidavit originally submitted was inadequate 
and that the attorney had failed to supplement it 
even upon the court's invitation to do so. In fact, 
the attorney had supplemented his fee affida\it. 
Because we are in doubt regarding whether these 
fees were inadvertently denied or whether the 
trial court had some other basis for denial we 
remand this issue for reexamination by the trial 
court. 
32 Additionally, we hold that the Railes are 
entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending 
their judgment on this appeal. They were the 
"successful party" in the trial court and on 
appeal to this court. Our law provides that a 
party which successfully defends an appeal that 
arose out of a cause of action under a mechanic's 
lien is entitled to the attorney fees spent on 
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 38-1-18: see also 
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development 
Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980); 
Richards v. Security Pac. Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 
606. 612 (Utah Ct App. 1993). However, the 
Railes are not entitled to fees in pursuing their 
unsuccessful motion to dismiss this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
33 We hold that this court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal. The evidence supports the judgment 
that an accord and satisfaction occurred between 
the parties. Therefore, we affirm in part and 
remand for reexamination of the denial of court 
costs and $7,500 in attorney fees. Additionally, 
the trial court shall fix reasonable attorney fees 
awardable to the Railes for defending the 
judgment on appeal, but not in pursuit of its 
motion to dismiss the appeal. 
34 Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice 
Stewart, Justice Zimmerman, and Justice Russon 
concur in Chief Justice Howe's opinion. 
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Utah Supreme Court 
precludes the enforcement of an unsigned 
contingent fee agreement. The district court 
concluded that the agreement was unenforceable 
and granted Westenskow's summary judgment 
motion. On appeal, Holt contends that rule 
1.5(c) does not establish the contractual 
elements required to form a valid contingent fee 
agreement. We decline to address this issue, 
however, because we lack jurisdiction. The 
appeal before us is not from a final judgment. 
Nor does it qualify for an exception to the final 
judgment rule. As a result, we dismiss this case 
without reaching its merits. 
[7] 





First District. Brigham City The Honorable 
Thomas Willmore 
[9] 
^1 This case involves a dispute over attorney 
fees between Scott Holt and his former clients. 
Donald Westenskow and Bonnie Loffredo. The 
central question presented is whether rule 1.5(c) 




%2 Following a car crash that resulted in the 
death of their daughter, Westenskow and 
Loffredo hired attorneys to represent them in a 
wrongful death action. Loffredo retained Holt as 
her attorney and entered into a contingent fee 
agreement with him. This signed contract stated 
that Holt would receive twenty-five percent of 
any recovery obtained before the 
commencement of a lawsuit and thirty-three 
percent of any recovery garnered thereafter. The 
agreement also included a dispute provision. It 
declared that in the event a legal proceeding was 
necessary to enforce the terms of the contract. 
the defaulting party would be liable for 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
[12] 
IP Westenskow initially asked anodier attorney 
to represent him in the suit, but later retained 
Holt. Holt did not reduce the terms of his 
representation to writing at the outset, although 
he and Westenskow orally agreed that 
Westenskow would pay die same contingent fee 
percentage as Loffredo. Following this oral 
agreement. Holt mailed a written contingent fee 
agreement to Westenskow. Wcstenskowr did not 
sign the written agreement or return it to Holt. 
[13] 
1(4 Subsequently, Farmer's Insurance Exchange 
filed a declaratory relief action, naming 
Westenskow and Loffredo as defendants. 
Farmer's Insurance demanded relief from the 
district court because it was one of three 
insurance companies potentially responsible for 
providing insurance coverage in the wrongful 
death action contemplated by Westenskow and 
Loffredo. Eventually, the three insurance 
companies settled with Westenskow and 
Loffredo, and tendered payment via three 
separate checks. As each check was received. 
Holt deducted thirty-three percent of the money 
for himself and withheld that amount as his fee. 
He apportioned the remaining proceeds between 
his two clients., with seventy percent going to 
Loffredo and thirty percent to Westenskow. In 
accepting die settlement money, both 
Westenskow and Loffredo signed three separate 
settlement statements. The signed statements 
noted that Holt was retaining thirty-three percent 
of the recovered funds. 
[14] 
!^5 Thereafter. Loffredo and Westenskow sued 
Holt, contending that he was not entitled to 
iasteaso 
withhold thirty-three percent of the total amount 
recovered and demanding that he disgorge the 
funds. Westenskow argued that Holt was not 
entitled to collect a contingent fee because he 
never signed a written agreement with Holt. 
Loffredo alleged that Holt knowingly 
misrepresented die terms of the written 
contingent fee contract she had signed. She 
maintained that Holt should have been limited to 
a twenty-five percent recovery. The total amount 
that Loffredo and Westenskow demanded 
equaled $45,000. 
[15] 
1f6 Following die submission of summary 
judgment motions by both sides, the district 
court ruled in favor of Westenskow and against 
Loffredo. The court decided as a matter of law 
that a valid contingent fee agreement did not 
exist between Westenskow and Holt because 
rule 1.5(c) of die Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct required such agreements to be in 
writing. Nevertheless, the trial court afforded 
Holt an opportunity to recover a reasonable 
hourly fee for die time he had spent on 
Westenskow's case. It ordered Holt to prepare an 
accounting of his services and submit die 
statement within twenty days. Holt failed to 
meet diat deadline, delivering time estimates to 
the court three months after the order was 
issued. Due to the delay, die trial court held diat 
Holt was not entitled to collect any fee from 
Westenskow and awarded Westenskow the fees 
Holt had retained plus interest. 
[16] 
117 With respect to Loffredo's contention diat 
Holt deducted an excessive fee percentage, the 
trial court granted Holt's summary judgment 
motion. It held that Loffredo was obligated to 
pay Holt a contingent fee of thirty-three percent, 
concluding that she agreed in writing to pay the 
higher fee percentage if a lawsuit was filed. 
[17] [21] 
T[8 Despite its various summan' judgment 
rulings, the district court did not completely 
dispose of all the summary judgment claims 
made by the parties. In particular, the trial court 
failed to address Holt's claim that he was entitled 
to additional attorney fees and costs from 
Loffredo for being forced to defend the terms of 
the contingent fee agreement in court. 
[18] 
T|9 Holt now appeals the district court's summary 
judgment order, arguing that Westenskow was 
not entitled to reimbursement and that Loffredo 
should have been ordered to pay him reasonable 
attorney fees and costs. Westenskow and 
Loffredo respond that we lack jurisdiction to 




f 10 This court does not have jurisdiction over an 
appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment, 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a), or qualifies for an 
exception to the final judgment rule. Bradbury v. 
Valencia. 2000 UT 50, f 9, 5 P.3d 649. Here, 
Holt appeals the district court's summary 
judgment order. *fnl He contends that we have 
jurisdiction over his appeal because the 
summary judgment order constituted a final 
judgment under section 78-2-2 of the Utah 
Code. It is undisputed, however, that a claim 
brought by Holt seeking attorney fees and costs 
from Loffredo is still pending before die trial 
court. We therefore conclude that the judgment 
from which Holt appeals is not final and must be 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 
C las tease 
I. HOLT'S APPEAL IS NOT TAKEN FROM A 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
[22] 
1)11 We have repeatedly affirmed die viability of 
the final judgment rule as a barrier to our 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bradbury, 2000 UT at \ 
10; A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co.. 817 
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991): Williams v. State, 
716 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1986). Generally 
speaking, the rule prevents a party from 
prematurely appealing a non-final judgment, and 
thereby preserves scarce judicial resources. See 
Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 
535 (Utah 1979). The rule saves this court from 
having to deal with "piecemeal appeals in the 
same litigation." Id. Where the final judgment 
rule is not satisfied, the proper remedy for this 
court is dismissal. See A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 
325. 
[23] 
f 12 For an order to constitute a final judgment, 
it must end the controversy between the 
litigants. See Kennedy. 600 P.2d at 536. In other 
words, to be considered a final order, the trial 
court's decision must dispose of the claims of all 
parties. Bradbury, 2000 UT at If 10. A judgment 
is not final if the trial court has failed to 
determine whether attorney fees should be 
awarded. This is the precise issue we resolved in 
ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 
concluding as follows: "[A] trial court must 
determine the amount of attorney fees awardable 
to a party before the judgment becomes final for 
the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3." 2000 UT 4 , ^ 15, 998 
P.2d 254. 
[24] 
HI3 Our holding in ProMax governs the 
outcome of this case. Here, besides claiming that 
he had a contractual right to deduct thirty-three 
percent of the settlement recovery as his fee. 
Holt's summary' judgment motion asked the 
district court to award him reasonable attorney 
fees and costs from Loffredo. The district court 
never resolved this claim. Accordingly, the 
judgment from which Holt appeals is not final. 
[25] 
1114 The only argument Holt has advanced 
supporting his assertion that this appeal is from a 
final judgment is that the trial court ruled upon 
"the majority of the issues." We stress that the 
final judgment rule does not stand for the 
proposition that the lower court need only 
resolve the majority of the claims for us to 
entertain the case. Rather, it requires diat all 
claims, including requests for attorney fees, be 
decided in order for a decision to be 
appropriately appealed to this court. See id. 
Strict compliance with this principle is necessary 
to preserve "the interests] of judicial economy." 
Id. If we adopted Holt's position, we would 
essentially gut the final judgment rule of much 
of its practical meaning and effectiveness. 
Consequently, the appeal at issue is not taken 
from a final judgment and we cannot sustain our 
jurisdiction under that rationale. 
[26] 
II. HOLT'S APPEAL DOES NOT QUALIFY 
FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE FINAL 
JUDGMENT RULE 
[27] 
II15 We next consider whether Holt's appeal 
qualifies for an exception to the final judgment 
rule. Three possible exceptions exist. See 
Bradbury, 2000 UT at ^ 12. First, non-final 
judgments merit our review if the three 
lastua^e 
requirements of rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Pate v. 
Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 
1984). Second, we have jurisdiction over 
interlocutory orders when a party obtains our 
permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 5: 
Bradbury., 2000 UT at H 12. Finally, we can 
entertain a non-final judgment if an appeal is 
permitted by statute. Bradbury, 2000 UT at H 12. 
[28] 
1116 The appeal before us neither complies with 
those procedures specified for certification under 
rule 54(b), see Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), nor 
satisfies the requirements set forth for an 
interlocutory appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 5. 
Moreover, there is no applicable statute granting 
an exception, hi fact, Holt does not even allege 
that any of the exceptions apply. Hence, none of 
the exceptions provide us with a legitimate 




HI7 For the reasons articulated above, we 
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of this case. The mere assertion by Holt 
that his appeal is taken from a final order is 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this 
court. Because the summary judgment order 
from which Holt appealed left his request for 
attorney fees and costs unresolved, his appeal is 
not from a final judgment. Moreover, none of 
the exceptions to the final judgment rule apply 
to the instant action. Accordingly, we dismiss 
this appeal without prejudice and remand it to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
[31] 
"[18 Chief Justice Howe. Associate Chief Justice 
Russon. Justice Durham, and Justice Wiikms 





*fnl Loffredo has not appealed the district 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court exceeded the permitted range of discretion in 
awarding costs for two trial exhibits to Brent C. Hansen. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) governs awards of costs and provides that "costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Under this 
rule, the party who claims costs must submit a memorandum including "the items of his costs and 
necessary disbursements in the action." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). "A trial court's decision to award the 
prevailing party its costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 
98,TJ10, 17 P.3d 1122 (citing Young v. State, 2000 UT 91,14, 16 P.3d 549). 
Hansen sought and obtained an aw?ard of costs incurred for preparation of enlarged photographic and 
medical exhibits used at trial. "That [Hansen] chose to have these documents reproduced on poster board 
does not make them a 'necessary disbursement' under rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,^24, 31 P.3d 1147. 
Page 2 
To the contrary, '"trial exhibits are expenses of litigation and not taxable as costs.'" Id. at f25 (quoting 
Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at ^14) (additional citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the district court 
exceeded the permitted range of discretion in awarding costs for the two trial exhibits in the amount of 
$194.88. 
Accordingly, we vacate the award of costs for trial exhibits. 
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge. 
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SMITH, Associate Justice. 
We consider an appeal by defendants 
Roman Praszker and West and Praszker 
Realtors, Inc. (collectively Praszker) and a 
cross-appeal by plaintiff Norman I. Krug Real 
Estate Investments, Inc. arising from a judgment 
of the superior court in favor of Krug and 
against Praszker in the sum of $27,144.73. The 
judgment was rendered after the court found that 
Praszker, who listed property on which Krug 
held an unrecorded deed of trust, was negligent 
in failing to disclose the existence of Krug's 
security interest to a prospective buyer or to 
inform Krug beforehand of the impending sale. 
BACKGROUND 
Krug is a California corporation operated 
by Norman I. Krug (hereafter both are referred 
to as Krug), engaged in the business of making 
real estate investments. In 1978 Krug and Dr 
Robert A. Gilbert acquired a multi-unit 
apartment building at 445 Webster Street San 
Fiancisco (445 Webster). The parties agreed that 
last 
they would operate the property as an equal 
partnership, with Dr. Gilbert assuming 
responsibility for managing the property. 
Subsequently, Gilbert spent approximately 
$90,000 of his own funds on the property and 
requested reimbursement from Krug for half of 
the amount. Krug balked at the request, and the 
parties ultimately agreed that, rather than 
reimburse Gilbert, Krug would deed Gilbert his 
share of the property in return for a promissory 
note secured by a third deed of trust in the 
amount of $90,000. However, if Gilbert paid 
Krug $40,000 before February 1, 1984, the note 
would be considered paid in full. 
At the time the agreement was signed, the 
parties orally agreed that Krug would forgo 
recording his third deed of trust in order to allow 
Gilbert to [220 Cal.App.3d 40] refinance the 
property. In March of 1981, the property was 
refinanced and Krug received the sum of 
$17,919.41 toward payment of the note. 
Encountering financial difficulties, Gilbert 
went into default on a number of properties he 
owned, including 445 Webster. He therefore 
contacted an old acquaintance Roman Praszker, 
sole owner of West and Praszker Realtors, Inc., 
for the purpose of listing the properties for sale. 
He told Praszker of Krug's unrecorded deed of 
trust and, in substance, asked Praszker to "take 
caie of everything," including the deed of trust. 
Praszker agreed. On December 14, 1981, 
Praszker listed the subject property for sale. 
On January 6, 1982, Krug and Praszker had 
a telephone conversation in which Praszker 
informed Krug that a sale of 445 Webster to the 
Eftil Corporation was pending and advised him 
that if he intended to protect his third deed of 
trust he should record it. Krug said he would 
think about it, and Praszker gave him the name 
of the title company handling the transaction. 
The contract of sale to the Eftil Corporation 
expressly disclosed the existence of Krug's third 
deed of trust, but the sale collapsed. One month 
later, however, the property was sold to the 
Noble Group, with Praszker acting as the realtor 
for both buyer and seller. At no time did 
Praszker inform Krug of the pending sale to 
Noble, nor did he tell Noble of the existence of 
Krug's unrecorded lien. 
The property was sold to Noble Group for 
$1 above existing recorded encumbrances, but 
the fair market value of the property at the time 
was actually far greater. Upon learning that the 
property had been sold, Krug filed suit against 
Dr. Gilbert 
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to collect the balance on the promissory note. 
Gilbert declared bankruptcy on February 8, 
1984, and Krug's attorneys pursued the claim in 
the bankruptcy court, resulting in a cash 
settlement of $11,000. 
On March 18, 1985 Krug filed suit against 
Praszker. Although the case proceeded to trial 
on a number of theories, the court rendered 
judgment for Krug strictly on negligence 
grounds. The court found that "[wjhatever 
Plaintiffs motivation was previously in not 
recording its Third Deed of Trust, Defendants' 
failure to disclose and failure to inform Plaintiff 
of the impending sale effectively extinguished 
Plaintiffs security interest in the subject 
Property, thus proximately damaging Plaintiff 
r 
last 
and preventing Plaintiff from recording its Third 
Deed of Trust." 
The court ruled that Krug was entitled to 
recover the $40,000 balance due under the note 
at the time of the sale to Noble Group, plus 12 
[220 Cal.App.3d 41] percentinterest, less the 
$17,919.41 previously received by Krug from 
the refinance proceeds and the $11,000 Krug 
collected from the bankruptcy settlement, for a 
total judgment of $27,144.73. After a subsequent 
motion to tax costs, the trial court allowed Krug 
to recover $8,379 in attorneys fees and 
$2,012.60 in costs incurred in his pursuit of Dr. 
Gilbert in the state and bankruptcy courts. 
Praszker filed a notice of appeal from the 
judgment alone. Krug filed a cross-appeal. 
APPEAL 
I 
Statute of Limitations ** 
II 
Duty of Care 
Praszker contends that under the facts 
found by the trial court he owed no duty of care 
to Krug as a matter of law, or if he had such duty 
it was discharged by the January 1982 
conversation in which he advised Krug to record 
his deed of 1 rust. 
The term "duty" is only an expression of 
policy considerations that lead the law to say 
that a particular plaintitt is entitled to protection. 
(De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transportation 
Co. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 782, 794, 225 
Cal.Rptr. 789; Thompson v. County of Alameda 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 749-750, 167 Cal.Rptr. 
70, 614 P.2d 728.) The existence of a legal duty 
is a question of law for the court. (Leger v. 
Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 
Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688; 
Thompson v. County of Alameda, supra, 27 
Cal.3d at p. 750, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 
728.) 
Praszker does not dispute that he knew of 
Krug's unrecorded third deed of trust and of the 
proposed sale to Noble Group at a price which 
would not cover Dr. Gilbert's indebtedness to 
Krug, but claims there was no duty of disclosure 
with respect to the Noble transaction. He urges 
at the outset that he had no privity of contract 
with Krug and therefore had no special 
relationship which would create a legal 
obligation toward him. However, "a defendant 
can be liable for economic harm inflicted upon a 
third party with whom he has no direct dealing, 
provided that the [220 Cal.App.3d 42] 
consideration of appropriate factors warrants the 
imposition of a duty to the third party." (Seeley 
v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 860, 
237 Cal.Rptr. 282.) 
Civil Code section 2343 entitled "Agent's 
responsibility to third persons" provides that 
"One who assumes to act as an agent is 
responsible to third persons as a principal for his 
acts in the course of his agency, in any of the 
following cases.... [p]'s ... 3. When his acts are 
wrongful in their nature." (Emphasis added.) 
California cases recognize a fundamental 
duty on the part of a realtor to deal honestly and 
fairly with all parties in the sale transaction. 
(Nguyen v. Scott (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 725, 
735, 253 Cal.Rptr. 800; Easton v. Strassburger 
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 90, 100-101, 199 
Cal.Rptr. 383; Hale v. Wolfsen (1969) 276 
Cal.App.2d 285, 292, 81 Cal.Rptr. 23.) "There is 
little question that a real estate broker owes a 
duty of care to third persons in the transaction, 
where the 
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brokei does not have privity with, or fiduciary 
duties to, such third person. The question is the 
extent of that duty that will be imposed on the 
broker." (2 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d 
ed. 1989) (Miller & Starr), § 3.27, p. 157.) This 
question is answered by weighing a number of 
factors, including the extent the transaction was 
intended to affect the third party, the 
foreseeability of harm, the degree of certainty 
last 
the third party suffered injury, the moral blame 
attached to the broker's conduct, and the policy 
of preventing future harm. (Op. cit. supra, at pp. 
157-158; see generally J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory 
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 804, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407, 
598 P.2d 60; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 
Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16.) 
The imposition of a duty on a realtor to 
disclose a known unrecorded lien interest is 
supported by standards already existing in the 
industry. The Code of Ethics of the National 
Association of Realtors 2 provides that a realtor 
has an obligation to treat fairly all persons to the 
transaction (Article 7) and to assure that all 
financial obligations and commitment be 
reduced to writing (Article 20). 
The most important step in determining if a 
broker owes a duty of care to a third party is to 
examine "whether a reasonable person would 
have foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to 
the third person and whether in view of such risk 
the broker exercised ordinary care under the 
circumstances." [220 Cal.App.3d 43] 2 Miller & 
Starr at p. 158.) Here, Praszker knew that his 
client Dr. Gilbert had fallen on financial hard 
times and was in default on 445 Webster; he also 
knew that Krug held an unrecorded security 
interest in the property; he knew or certainly 
should have known that the sale to Noble Group 
would not satisfy the outstanding indebtedness 
to Krug and that there was a significant risk that 
Krug's security would be destroyed if the sale 
went through without disclosure to the buyer or 
Krug. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Praszker 
kept both the buyer and Krug in the dark about 
the sale, resulting in Krug's loss of his security. 
Praszker had obviously earlier understood the 
importance of his obligation of disclosure as 
exemplified by his conduct with respect to the 
proposed sale to Eftil Corporation. However, he 
chose to remain silent about the subject on the 
second sale. Both the policy of preventing future 
harm and considerations of moral blame compel 
the imposition of a duty on the part of a realtor 
never to allow a desire to consummate a deal or 
collect a commission to take precedence over his 
fundamental obligation of honesty, fairness and 
full disclosure toward all parties. " 'The real 
estate broker is brought by his calling into a 
relation of trust and confidence. Constant are the 
opportunities by concealment and collusion to 
extract illicit gains.... He is accredited by his 
calling in the minds of the inexperienced or the 
ignorant with a knowledge greater than their 
own.' " (Easton v. Strassburger, supra, 152 
Cal.App.3d at p. 100, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383, quoting 
Roman v. Lobe (1926) 243 N.Y. 51, 54-55, 152 
N.E. 461.) As stated in the Preamble to the 
National Association of Realtors' Code of 
Ethics, "The term REALTOR has come to 
connote competency, fairness, and high integrity 
resulting from adherence to a lofty ideal of 
moral conduct in business relations. No 
inducement of profit ... can justify departure 
from this ideal." We hold that Praszker owed a 
duty to disclose to Noble the existence of the 
third deed of trust or inform Krug of the 
impending escrow. Although expert testimony is 
not determinative on the subject, it is noteworthy 
that all three experts who testified at trial agreed, 
at least in principle, with this conclusion. 
We do not accept Praszker's argument that 
he fulfilled his obligation of fairness by 
informing Krug in January 1982 of the proposed 
sale to Eftil. When the listing was originally 
taken, Praszker substantively promised Dr. 
Gilbert that he would 
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"take care of everything" including Krug's third 
deed of trust. Once that sale fell through and a 
new escrow was opened, Praszker's duties of 
disclosure arose anew. As a result of his silence, 
Noble was allowed to take the property free and 
clear of the Krug deed of trust and his security 
interest was destroyed. Substantial evidence 
supports the trial court's determination that the 
duty was breached. 





In response to Praszker's request for a 
finding on the issue, the trial court's statement of 
decision declares that "[t]he facts do not support 
an allocation of damages between Plaintiff and 
Defendants under the doctrine of comparative 
negligence." Praszker argues that this finding is 
irreconcilable with the evidence and the facts as 
found by the court. We agree. 
We recognize that the question of 
contributory negligence is ordinarily one for the 
trier of fact and becomes a question of law only 
if the evidence is of such a character that it will 
support no other legitimate inference. (Simmons 
v. Wexler (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1012, 
156 Cal.Rptr. 810; Hiner v. Hubbard (1966) 240 
Cal.App.2d 63, 69, 49 Cal.Rptr. 157; Shoemaker 
v. State of California (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 
379, 386, 20 Cal.Rptr. 812.) However, this is 
one of those rare cases where the undisputed 
evidence, coupled with the finding of trial court 
concerning the January 6 telephone 
conversation, permits no other legitimate 
conclusion. 
Krug testified that he discovered in 
November 1981 that Dr. Gilbert had fallen 
behind on his payments and that a notice of 
default had been recorded by the second 
mortgage holder. He wrote several letters to 
Gilbert and Gilbert's attorney voicing his alarm 
at the situation and concern that action be taken. 
He received no response. Contrary to Krug's 
denial, the trial court made a specific finding 
that on January 6, 1982 Praszker told Krug of 
the pending sale of the Property to Eftil and 
advised him that if he intended to protect 
himself he should record the deed of trust. Krug, 
however, did nothing. 
Civil Code 1714 states the basic principle 
that everyone is responsible for injury to another 
caused by his want of ordinary care, " 'except so 
far as the latter has, willfully or by want of 
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.'" 
(Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 
816, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226.) The 
adoption of comparative negligence was 
intended to vindicate the rationale behind the 
statutory maxim that " 'persons are responsible 
for their acts to the extent theii fault contributes 
to an injurious result.' " (Id., at p. 828, 119 
Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226.) 
As a result of the January conversation, 
Krug knew there was an escrow pending and 
that a sale could close at any time, posing a 
genuine danger that he would not be paid. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, he was [220 
Cal.App.3d 45] wholly indifferent to the 
imminent danger presented to his unrecorded 
lien. Krug's own expert Harry Miller minced no 
words in expressing his opinion when 
questioned on the subject: "Q. Isn't it your 
opinion, Mr. Miller, that if Mr. Krug had spoken 
with Mr. Praszker and Mr. Praszker told Mr. 
Krug to record his action [sic] and Mr. Krug did 
not, that Mr. Krug would then have some 
responsibility for his failure to act? [p] A. Yes. 
In fact, with that knowledge, Mr. Krug would 
have to be an idiot not to react." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Krug's complete failure to take any sort of 
action to protect his security, such as monitoring 
the pending sale, recontacting Praszker, or 
recording his deed of trust constitutes a failure to 
exercise ordinary care in the management of his 
affairs as a matter of law. Consequently the trial 
court erred in failing to apportion the damages 
suffered by Krug to the extent by which they 
were proximately caused by his own negligence. 
The amount of such apportionment, however, is 
a factual issue which is best left to the trial court. 
IV 
Attorney's Fees 
Praszker next challenges the court's award 
of attorney's fees to Krug incurred 
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in prosecuting his suits against Dr. Gilbert in 
state and federal court, based upon the "tort of 
another" doctrine. (See Gray v. Don Miller & 
Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 505, 198 
Cal.Rptr. 551, 674 P.2d 253; Prentice v. North 
last 
Amer. Title Guar. Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 
620-621, 30 Cal.Rptr. 821, 381 P.2d 645.) The 
order allowing such fees is not reviewable here 
however, because no appeal was taken from it. 
There is no judgment in this case awarding 
Krug "litigation costs as an element of his 
damages.~Kather, attorney's fees and related 
costs in the Gilbert matter was included in 
Krug's cosTbill and the issue of whether Tlrug 
was entitled to such sums was deferred until 
after judgment and litigated by way of aTnotion 
to tax costs. 3 
On May 5, 1988 the court filed an amended 
judgment, which awarded Krug $273JJ4/Z.3lplus 
interest in compensatory damages. Four days 
later, [220 Cal.App.3d 461 the court filed its 
"Order In re Motion Taxing Costs," in which it 
denied Praszker's motion to tax the claimed 
litigation'costs. Notwithstanding the rendition of 
^iT~poffiudgiT^T"order, Praszker's notice of 
appeal expressly limits itself to the May 5 
judgment. No appeal was ever taken trom the 
May 9 order. 
"If a judgment or order is appealable, an 
aggrieved party must tile a timely appeal or 
forever lose the opportunity to obtain appellate 
revise" (Eisenberg, Horvitz & Wiener, Cal. 
Practice Guide, Civil Appeals and Writs (Rutter 
1989) (Eisenberg), § 2.13, p. 2-5, citing Code 
Civ. Proc. § 906 and Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 
186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967, 231 Cal.Rptr. 241, 
emphasis original.) A postjudgment order which 
awards or denies costs or attorney's fees js 
separately appealable. (Eisenberg, § 2:156, p. 2-
42; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of 
Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 223, 226 
Cal.Rptr. 265; Rich v. City of Benicia (1979) 98 
Cal.App.3d 428, 432, 159 Cal.Rptr. 473; Raff v. 
Raff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 514, 519, 39 Cal.Rptr. 
366, 393 P.2d 678; Code Civ.Proc. § 904.1, 
subd. (b)), and if no appeal is taken from such an 
order, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to 
review it. (Hardin v. Elvitsky (1965) 232 
CaI.App.2d 357, 363-364, 42 Cal.Rptr. 748.) 4 
Nor can we construe the notice of appeal as 
applying to the May 9 order under the rule of 
liberal construction. (Cat.Rules of Court, rule 
1(b).) The notice, filed on May 26, 1988 states: 
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that defendants 
ROMAN PRASZKER and WEST & 
PRASZKER REALTORS, INC. appeal from the 
judgment filed May 5, 1988, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit 'A.' " (Emphasis added.) 
Only a copy of the May 5 judgment was 
appended. Thus, despite Praszker's knowledge 
of the May 9 order allowing litigation costs and 
attorney's fees, the notice of appeal 
unambiguously designates only the May 5 
judgment. 
Praszker's citation to Kellett v. Marvel 
(1936) 6 Cal.2d 464, 58 P.2d 649 is not availing. 
In that case the notice of appeal was ambiguous-
-it stated that the party was appealing from an 
order denying a motion to resist entry of 
judgment, but gave a judgment book entry 
description which fit that of a final judgment of 
divorce. The court, noting the ambiguity and 
rule of [220 Cal.App.3d 47] liberal construction, 
treated the appeal as one from the divorce 
judgment. Kellett is not apposite because there is 
no ambiguity whatever in Praszker's 
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notice. The rule favoring appealability in cases 
of ambiguity cannot apply where there is a clear 
intention to appeal from only part of the 
judgment or one of two separate appealable 
judgments or orders. (9 Witkin, op. cit. supra, 
Appeal, § 372, p. 374.) "Despite the rule 
favoring liberal interpretation of notices of 
appeal, a notice of appeal will not be considered 
adequate if it completely omits any reference to 
the judgment being appealed." (Shiver, 
McGrane & Martin v. Littell (1990) 217 
Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045,266 Cal.Rptr. 298.) 
Praszker points out that Krug has never 
challenged the sufficiency of the notice of 
appeal and both parties have treated the issue as 
if it were properly before us. But subject matter 
jurisdiction can never be created by consent, 
waiver or estoppel. (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra, 
Jurisdiction, § 10, p. 374.) Thus, Krug's failure 
last 
to point out the jurisdictional defect is of no 
consequence. (See Hardin v. Elvitsky, supra, 
232 Cal.App.2d at p. 363, 42 Cal.Rptr. 748.) 
Because Praszker's notice of appeal totally omits 
any reference to the appealable order granting 
litigation costs and attorney's fees, this court has 




The judgment is reversed. The cause is 
remanded to the trial court with directions to 
make new findings on the issue of comparative 
negligence and enter a new judgment consistent 
with views expressed herein. Praszker shall 
recover costs on appeal. 
KLINE, P.J., and BENSON, J., concur. 
* Pursuant 1o rules 976 and 976.1, California 
Rules of Court, this opinion is certified for 
publication except for part I and the section 
entitled "Cross-Appeal." 
** See footnote *, ante. 
2 The Code was received into evidence by the 
trial court in this case. It is also appropriate for 
this court to take judicial notice of it as bearing 
on the standard of care for professionals in the 
industry. (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (h); Easton v. 
Strassburger, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 90, 101, fn. 
5, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383.) 
3 The court's order recites that "the parties 
stipulated and the Court ordered that claim [sic] 
damages for attorneys fees and costs would be 
bifurcated and decided by the Court. 
Procedurally the Court stated without objection 
that it would reach those elements of damage by 
way of cost bill." 
4 We reject Praszker's facile argument that the 
recitation in the May 5 judgment that plaintiff be 
awarded judgment together with "costs and 
disbursements" was sufficient to encompass the 
subsequently-awarded litigation costs. Under the 
court's order and stipulation of the parties, Krug 
did not become entitled to such costs until a cost 
bill was filed and the motion to tax determined 
in a separate proceeding. Moreover, acceptance 
of Praszker's position would sabotage the rule 
that postjudgment orders allowing or denying 
costs and attorneys fees must be separately 
appealed from, since virtually all judgments 
routinely provide for "costs" to the prevailing 
garty. 
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Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Order after consideration After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to Rule 50, the Supreme Court 
will enter an order denying the petition or granting the petition in whole or in part The order shall be decided summarily, 
shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a decision on the merits The clerk shall not issue a formal writ 
unless directed by the Supreme Court 
(b) Grant of petition 
(1) Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall 
notify the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of record 
(2) If the record has not previously been filed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall request the clerk of the court with 
custody of the record to certify it and transmit it to the Supreme Court 
(3) The clerk shall file the record and give notice to the parties of the date on which it was filed and the date on which 
petitioner's brief is due 
(4) Rules 24 through 31 shall govern briefs, argument, and disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari In applying Rules 
24 through 31, the petitioner shall stand in the place of the appellant and the respondent in the place of the appellee 
(c) Denial of petition Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that effect will be entered, and the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of record 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the 
court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter 
by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence 
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the 
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of 
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of 
the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in 
amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this 
state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs 
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall 
abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall 
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment 
serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of 
his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have 
been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, 
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs 
taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall 
nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by 
him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same 
have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
